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Journal of the Asiatic Society
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THE USEFULNESS OF MODERN ECONOMIC THEORIES FOR THE STUDY OF ECONOMIC HISTORY OF ANCIENT INDIA—AN ILLUSTRATION

By B. N. Mukherjee

A

Coins, survived into our age from an earlier period, are living commentaries on the dead past. Issued by state or private authorities chiefly to facilitate trade and commerce, their potentiality as sources of information on economic history can hardly be overestimated.

Their usefulness for reconstructing the economic history of ancient India is, however, greatly impaired by frequent absence of intelligible mint marks from the coins struck in India in the centuries immediately before or after the beginning of the Christian Era. Nevertheless, such defects may be rectified in certain cases by analysing, with the help of modern economic principles, the conditions in which they were minted.

B

An interesting case for such a study seems to be provided by a jar containing twenty-one coins of good silver and other valuable objects, discovered at a Scytho-Parthian and early Kushāṇa stratum of Sirkap in Taxila situated in the north-western part of the Indian subcontinent.[1] These pieces, of approximately the same size and weight,[2] bear the bust of a king and Greek legend on the obverse, and Nike and Kharoshṭhī inscription on the reverse.[3] On the latter side of the majority of these issues appears an identical mint mark(?) (the Kharoshṭhī letter *bhu*).[4] The peculiar symbol (,ɣ) of Gondophares I[5]

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[1] J. Marshall, *Taxila*, vol. I, pp. 160-161.

[2] *Ibid*, vol. II, pp. 776 and 785.

[3] Ibid, pp. 815-816 and 820; vol. III, pl. 241. no. 201-208 and 211-214; pl. 242, no. 215 and 217-221; pl. 242, no. 258-260

[4] *Ibid*, no. 201, 202 (?), 203 (?), 205-207, 212-213, 215, 218 and 219-221.

[5] The earliest king in India, on whose coins the symbol in question appears, is Gondophares I (*PMC*, vol. I, p. 146f)

occurs definitely on thirteen[1] and probably on another five[2] of the twenty-one coins in question.

Of the pieces bearing the Kharoshṭhī letter *bhu*, eight have been attributed to Sasan,[3] five to (Sa)pedanes[4] and five to Satavastra.[5] The three coins, which do not display the Gondopharian symbol, have been ascribed to the Kushāṇas.[6]

However, these ascriptions made by J.H. Marshall,[7] do not appear to be fully correct. According to R.B. Whitehead and J. Allan, the name Aga......(?) can be read on a coin assigned by Marshall to (Sa)pedanes.[8] Again, on another piece, referred to the latter ruler, the Greek legend appears as... ΑϹΠШΝΔΟ .[9] Since we have examples of ligatures of parts of distinct letters in Greek legends on species of the Scytho-Parthian and Kushāṇa ages,[10] and since the archaeological stratification indicates the coin in question as one minted in one of these periods, it seems legitimate to decipher the inscription under discussion as `(ΜΕΓ?)ΑϹ ΓШΝΔΟ .[11] Thus *Gondo* should be the whole or a part of the appellation of the issuer of this particular coin. This at once reminds us of the name of Gondophares. On another piece, assigned again by Marshall to (Sa)pedanes (?),[12] we notice the word *Gadavhrasa*.[13] On the analogy of the name *Guduvhara* or *Gondopherres* (i.e. *Gondophares*)[14] written also as *Gadapharna*,[15]

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[1] *Taxila*, vol. III, pl. 241, no. 201-204, 208, 211-212 and 214; pl. 242, no. 215, 217-218 and 220-221.

[2] *Ibid*, pl. 241, no. 205-207 and 213; pl. 242, no. 219.

[3] *Ibid*, vol. II, p. 815, no. 201-208.

[4] *Ibid*, p. 816, no. 211-215.

[5] *Ibid*, p. 816, no. 217-221.

[6] *Ibid*, p. 820, no. 258-260.

[7] *Ibid*, pp. 815-816; vol. I, pp. 160-161.

[8] *Ibid*, p. 840 and 816, no. 212.

[9] *Ibid*, vol. III, pl. 242, no. 215.

[10] P. Gardner, *Catalogue of Coins of Greek and Scythic Kings in India and Bactria*, pl. XXII, 2 and 6.

[11] R. B. Whitehead, *Catalogue of Coins in the Panjab Museum Lahore* vol. I, pl. XVII, 36 etc. c.f. the legend *Basileos Basileon Megass Yudo(ph)eres Autokrato* appearing on a coin of Gondophares I (*CCGSK*, pl. XXII, 103; A. K. Markoff, *Unpublished Arsacid Coins*, pl. IV, 25; A.K Narain and G. K. Jenkins, *Coin Types of the Saka-Pahlava Kings of India*, pp. 16-17).

[12] *Taxila*, vol. II, p. 816, no. 213.

[13] *Ibid*, vol. II, pl. 241, no. 213.

[14] *PMC*, vol. I, pl. XV, no. 38 and pp. 146f.

[15] *Ibid*, p. 151.

Induph(e)-rres(<*Induph(e),rrou*[1] etc., the form *Gadavhra* may be taken to be another variant of the same name. And as no known ruler called Gondophares other than Gondophares I had anything to do with India or its borderlands, the two coins under discussion, bearing Kharoshṭhī script of those territories, should be attributed to him.[2]

The three coins, attributed to the Kushāṇas, appear to bear an identical bust and are apparently the issues of a single monarch. Marshall[3] and Whitehead[4] were inclined to identify this king with Kushāṇa Kujula. Rapson, however, thought that the coins in question show the portrait of the Kushāṇa king V'ima, wearing the distinguishing conical headdress.[5] Although the conical hat was also worn by other Kushāṇa rulers,[6] the thoery of attribution of the coins concerned to V'ima may be substantiated in another way. We may consider that the Greek letters on one of them decipherable as ...ΑΓΘΟΗ,[7] may well be parts of the words ΜΕΓΑΣ ΘΟΗΜΟ. The form ΟΟΗΜΟ certainly reminds us of the name of only one Kushāṇa monarch, viz. V'ima, whose name appears as *Ooēmo* in the obverse legends of his coins.[8]

Thus the Sirkap hoard contains coins of Gondophares I, Sasan, (Sa)pedanes, Satavastra, possibly a certain Aga........(?) and also the Kushāṇa monarch V'ima Kadphises. The uniformity in type, metal, size and weight of these species indicates them as forming a homogeneous group; and there can be little doubt that they are products of one single mint.[9] In fact, an identical mark, probably a mint-mark, appears on the majority of these issues.

Scholars are not unanimous in locating the mint concerned. R. B. Whitehead thinks that the Kharoshṭhī letter *bhu* can be seen also

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1 *P.M.C.* p. 152; pl. XV, no. 59; *NC*, 1950, p. 223; pl. XII, no. 13.

2 Another coin with identical types, metal and weight (?) appears to bear the name ΓΩΝΔΟ (*Taxila*, vol. III, pl. 241, no. 216). The latter word may be a part of the appellation... ΓΩΝΔΟ i.e. Gondophares. This piece was also found at Sirkap. (*Ibid*, vol. I, p. 188).

3 *Taxila*, vol. I, p. 161; vol. II, p. 841.

4 *Ibid.*, vol. II, p. 841.

5 E. J. Rapson (editor), *Cambridge History of India*. vol. I, pp. 580-581.

6 *Taxila*, vol. III, pl. 243, no. 258.

7 *Ibid*, vol. II, p. 786.

8 *CCGSK*, nos. 8f.

9 *Ibid*, vol. II, p. 776.

on the coinage of Vijayamitra's son and that the evidence of the relic casket inscription from Bajaur places him in that region. These factors, in the opinion of Whitehead, show that the coins in discussion also came from the same area.[1] Rapson was apparently inclined to locate these species in Taxila.[2] For according to him, they illustrate "the passing of Pahlava rule in eastern Gandhāra (Takshaśilā)".[3] Similar are the views of D. C. Sircar[4] and J. N. Banerjea.[5] A. Simonetta, on the other hand, observes that they "must have come from Pushkalāvatī the only town where the silver drachms must have continued to be used down to the last years of Hermaeus (and apparently for some time later) and which may have been captured by the Pahlavas".[6]

None of the above arguments seems to be convincing. The style, types and fabric of the coins of the Sirkap hoard are different from those of the issues of Vijayamitra's son.[7] Moreover, though the letter *bhu* and some other symbols or marks appear on the latter class of coins,[8] such a combination cannot be noticed on species from the Sirkap hoard.[9] Hence there is no real evidence of relationship between these two sets of coinages, and consequently of the connnection of the Sirkap pieces with the Bajaur region.

D

It is also difficult to locate the mint concerned either in Taxila or in Pushkalāvatī (modern Charsada)[10] or anywhere else in North-Western India or even in Arachosia. The silver coinage of North-Western India had become heavily debased by the time of Azes II,[11]

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[1] *Numismatic Chronicle*, 1944, pp. 101-104; *Taxila*, vol. II, p. 776, n. 1. Whitehead's opinion is here cited by Marshall. See also n. 31.

[2] *CHI*, vol. I, pp. 580-581.

[3] *Ibid*, p. 580.

[4] R. C. Majumdar (editor), *The Age of Imperial Unity*, pp. 131-132.

[5] K. A. Nilakanta Sastri (editor), *A Comprehensive History of India*, vol. II, pp. 217-218. See also J. E. Van Lohuizen-De Leeuw, *The Scythian Period*, p. 362.

[6] *East and West*, vol. IX, p. 170.

[7] *NC*. 1890, pl. XV, no. 7 and 8; *PMC*, vol. I, pl. XVII, no. iii; *Taxila*, vol. II, p. 776, n. 1.

[8] *PMC*, vol. I, pl. XVII, no. iii; *NC*, 1944, p. 100, fig. 2 and 3.

[9] *Taxila*, vol. II, pl. 241, no. 201f; pl. 243, no. 25, 8f.

[10] M. Wheeler, *Charsada, A Metropolis of North Western Frontier*, p. 3f.

[11] *Taxila*, vol. I, p. 68; vol. II, pp. 781 and 785; *JNSI*, vol. XXII, pp. 68-69. This heavy debasement of silver coinage in North-Western India and the borderlands probably compelled the Kushāṇas not to have any regular silver currency for those areas.

who was ousted by Gondophares I from at least a part of that region. We admit that the silver issues definitely minted by Hermaeus are of good or pure metal. But neither the rule of that king nor the coins of good silver, bearing his name can be attributed to so late a period as that of Azes II or of Gondophares I.[1]

The family of Azes I minted silver in Arachosia.[2] But Orthagnes, with whom should be associated the earliest years of the career of Gondophares I and who ruled over Arachosia immediately or rather soon after the sept of Azes I, did not strike any silver coin in that area.[3] This discontinuation was probably due to the contamination of the currency of the region in question by the heavily debased silver issues of Azes II. The presence of the latter in Arachosia is indicated by the contents of the hoards from Mir Zakah (near Gardez)[4] and Chaman (between Kandahar and Quetta).[5]

It is perhaps not very difficult to ascertain the reason for this increase of alloy in the metallic currency of North-Western India and thereabouts during the period (c. 50 B.C.—A.D. 50) in question. A comparative study of certain groups of silver coins bearing the name of Hermaeus, but issued after his death, indicate a gradual debasement of metal.[6] Known history suggests the prevalence of political unrest in parts of North-Western India and thereabout (Kabul area, etc.), towards the end or immediately after the rule of Hermaeus.[7] The lack of a strong political authority in a commercially important zone like North-Western India,[8] probably tempted private moneyers or/and irresponsible powers to mint coins. As they naturally wanted to make profit out of their new business, we should assume, on the analogy of later instances,[9] that sub-standard coinage began to be issued in that area.

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1 *Journal of the Numismatic Society of India*, vol. XVII, pt. II, pp. 20-21.

2 *Ibid*, p. 2.

3 *Ibid*, p. 23; *Com. His. Ind.* Vol. II, p. 210

4 R. Curiel and D. Schlumberger, *Tresors monêtaires D'Afghanistan*, pp. 67, 79 and 80.

5 *JNSI*, vol. XVII, pt. II, pp. 25-26.

6 *JNSI*, vol. XVII, pt. II, pp. 20-21; *CHI*, vol. I, pp. 361-562; B. N. Mukherjee, *Studies in Kushāṇa Genealogy and Chronology*, vol. I, ch. II, n. 26

7 See above n. 6; B. N. Mukherjee, *The Lower Indus Country*, c. A. D. 1-150, (in press), Bk. I, ch. III.

8 M. Wheeler, *Rome Beyond the Imperial Frontiers*, p. 131f; etc.

9 For example we may refer to the Dhodh inscription (A.D. 1170) speaking of the testing of 16 *drammas* before they were accepted as the price for a house. Such an incident alludes to the existence of sub-standard coinage.

Conditions were thus ripe for the operation of a modern economic principle called Gresham's Law after Sir Thomas Gresham, one of the masters of England's mint in the 16th century. This law enjoins that "all types of metallic money in circulation declared equal in value or purchasing power by the government must be kept equal in value or buying power. If they are not, the undervalued money will be hoarded, exported to places where its true value will be recognised, or melted down for sale in the bullion market, while the overvalued, cheaper money will be kept in circulation."[1]

That this actually happened in the North-West, is suggested by the evidence of the circulation of debased currency in that area in the later Scytho-Parthian period. This meanacing tendency to replace good money by bad money became so popular and powerful, that an important ruler like Azes II could not check it, and that later, even the Imperial Kushāṇas had to stop minting any regular silver coinage in their attempt to reform the currency system.[2]

It appears that Gondophares I came into a North-West India, which had already been habituated to use a debased currency. So was the case with contemporary Arachosia (and also Sakastana). Thus Gondophares I could not have usefully or profitably issued coins of good silver in any of these territories. Hence his silver coins, yielded by the Sirkap hoard, cannot be attributed to any mint of these regions.

There is, however, an area within the possible limits of the Kingdom of Gondophares I where any debased coinage might not have been in circulation from an earlier time.[3] We are referring to the lower Indus region, where the group of Gondophares I[4] and then its conquerors, the Kushāṇas,[5] ruled.[6] But there is no source which proves the rule of the family of Maues or of Azes I in the lower Indus country. At least no mint of their coins can be located there. There is also no ground to

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[1] H. Spero, *Money and Banking*, 1957, p. 9.

[2] See above page 4, note 11.

[3] See the summary of our article "Sasan and Seistan" published in the *Summary of Papers*, Allahabad Session of the Indian History Congress, 1965; B. N. Mukherjee, *An Agrippan Source —A study in Indo-Parthian History*, Appendix I.

[4] One of the Ethiopic version of *The Acts of Thomas* indicates Gondophares I's rule in, *inter alia*, India (with restricted geographical connotation) denoting the Lower Indus area (E. A. W, Budge, *Contendings of the Apostles*, vol. II; *Monthly Bulletin of the Asiatic Society*, August, 1966, p. 5). See also *Periplus Maris Erythraei*, see. 38.

[5] *Hou Han-shu* (Ssu-pi-piao edition) ch. 118, pp. 9-10.

[6] *Quarterly Review of Historical Studies*, vol. V, p. 181.

suggest the existence of a local silver currency in that area about the time of the group of Maues and of the sept of Azes I in the North-West.[1] Hence the people of the lower Indus country of the age of Gondophares I were probably not yet used to the gradual debasement of silver coinage already witnessed in the North-West, and would naturally have been prone to judge any silver coin on its intrinsic merit and not on its currency-value. It can be assumed, following Gresham's principle, that if they at all used silver coins, imported from the nearby area of North-West, these must have been earlier species of good metal. Consequently, if any one wanted to introduce an effective and readily acceptable silver currency in the lower Indus country about the time of Gondophares I, he must have been aware of the necessity of minting good silver.

This line of reasoning suggests the attribution of the silver coins of the Taxila hoard to a mint located somewhere in the lower Indus territory or modern Sind. Such an ascription is strongly supported by the fact that excavations at Saidpur stupa, near Tando-Mahammad-Khan in Sind, yielded a silver coin of Sapedana having the same types, size, weight and metal as those of the pieces found at Sirkap.[2] The evidence of the Saidpur piece appears to be very important if it is remembered that it is the only specimen of its class found anywhere outside Taxila, where the mint in question cannot be located.[3]

E

Thus by following, *inter alia*, Gresham's law we have been able to locate the mint of an important group of coins. This illustrates the usefulness of application of a modern economic principle in reconstructing the history of the monetary system of ancient India. It appears that at least at times modern techniques are helpful in understanding the economic problems of Early India.

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[1] R. D. Banerji was inclined to ascribe some copper coins of Sind, found at Mohenjo-Daro, to the Maurya Age. J. Marshall (editor), *Mohenjo-Daro and the Indus Civilisation*, vol. I, p. 122). But N. G. Majumdar convincingly proved that these should be placed after Vāsudeva I (c. A. D. 142 or 145-176) (*Ibid*, pp. 127-128).

[2] *Archaeological Survey of India, Annual Report*, 1914-1915, pp. 90 and 95.

[3] We may note here that J. Marshall once observed that the mint of the coins concerned should be placed in Sind or "Western India" (*Taxila*, vol. II, p. 776; see also p. 785). However, he did not define the limits of "Western India". D. W. MacDowall likes to attribute these coins to the middle indus region (*NC*, 1965, p. 144). But neither J. Marshall, nor D. W. MacDowall adduced any good reason for such ascriptions.

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VOWELS IN THE MURIA DIALECT

By SUDHIBHUSHAN BHATTACHARYA

1. The Gond people who are also known as *koytor*, are quite numerous and widely distributed in Madhya Pradesh and its neighbourhood. They may be divided into two major groups, namely, (1) *Raj Gond* mainly comprising the Gonds living in the Districts of Mandla, Chhindwara, Betul, Bhandara, Durg, Yeotmal and Adilabad and some parts of Chanda, and (2) *Bastar Gond* consisting of the Muria, Maria, Dorla and Koya tribes living in and around Bastar. But Gondi language, which is an important member of the Dravidian speech-family, strictly speaking should be divided into three major groups, namely, (1) Southern Gondi spoken by the Muria, Maria, Dorla and Koya of Bastar and the neighbouring regions in Orissa and Chanda, (2) Northern Gondi spoken by the Raj Gonds of the Districts of Mandla, Chhindwara, Betul, Bhandara, Durg and Chanda, and (3) Western Gondi spoken by the Raj Gonds of Yeotmal and Adilabad Districts. More information on these dialect divisions will be found in our *A Comparative Vocabulary of the Gondi Dialects* (*CVGD*)[1].

Uptil now the best source for our knowledge of the Gondi language is Trench's book[2] which deals with a Northern dialect. *DED*[3] derived its Gondi material mainly from Trench. The major dialect divisions in Gondi were for the first time clearly demonstrated in *CVGD*. But our knowledge about Southern Gondi is still incomplete. The Muria tribe live in the Northern part of Bastar. They speak an important dialect of southern Gondi, which was practically unknown before the publication *CVGD*[4]. This dialect was at first sampled by T. Burrow and the present writer in 1958 which was followed by some intensive work on it by the present writer in 1959. The object of this paper is to place before the readers an account of the Muria vowels with comparative notes on the vowels of Koya and the Abujhmar dialect of Maria, two other dialects of Southern Gondi.

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[1] by T. Burrow and S. Bhattacharya, Asiatic Society, Calcutta, vide its Journal, Vol. II, Nos 2,3 and 4, 1960.

[2] *Grammar of Gondi as Spoken in Betul District* by C. G. Chenevix Trench, vols. I and II, 1919 and 1921.

[3] *A Dravidian Etymological Dictionary* by T. Burrow and M. B. Emeneau, 1961.

[4] Verrier Elwin made this tribe somewhat famous by publishing his excellent monograph, *The Muria and Their Ghotul*, 1947.

2. The ten Dravidian vowels, viz. short *a*, *i*, *u*, *e*, and *o*, and the corresponding long ones, *ā*, *ī*, *ū*, *ē* and *ō*, are to be found also in Muria. Examples are: *ar-* to fall, *ār-* to cool oneself, *ji-*to tie, *jī-* to cut wood, *uh-* to give to drink, *ūh-* to swing (trans.), *rengat* light red, *rēnga* plum, *goḍe* louse, *gōḍe* large black ant, etc.

The sounds *a* and *ā* are unrounded, low, central and unrounded low, back, vowels, respectively, and *i*, *ī* are unrounded high front, *e*, *ē* unrounded higher-mid front, *u*, *ū* rounded, high, back and *o*, *ō* rounded higher-mid, back, vowels,

3. Allophonic middle vowels are not many in this dialect. Occasionally, and particularly from informants coming from the eastern region of the Muria area, a lower high *U* and a mean-mid *o* have been recorded as allophones of *o*, e.g. *kokil*, *kUkli* cough, *huṛtom*, *huṛtUm* we saw, *korr*, *ko'rr* fowl, *ḍokke*, *ḍokke* garden lizard, etc. The unrounded, mean-mid, central *ə* and its unrounded, back, lower-mid variety, which are common sounds in Halbi (the common Indo-Aryan speech of Bastar widely used also by the Murias), have not affected the Muria *a* which is still a low, central, vowel. But the mean-mid *ə* has occurred in some Muria texts in some Halbi words as an allophone of *a*, e.g. *pīlamen* children, *təb* then, etc.

4. Koya is another dialect of Southern Gondi. It is spoken in South Bastar and South Koraput near the banks of the Godavari river. The mean-mid *ə* has been recorded in some native Koya words as an allophone of *o*, e.g. *ovor*, *ovər* salt. We have recorded also a few Koya words where a lower-mid front *ϵ* has been used as a variant of *e*, e.g. *mϵka* goat, *ad mϵlta* she is good, etc. In the Abujhmaṛ dialect of Gondi spoken in Bastar only one case of *ϵ* has been found in my field-noted, e.g. *peṛēnḍu*, *pϵṛa ēnḍu* next year. Occurrence of a lower-high back *U* as an allophone of *o* is commoner in this dialect of Gondi: *oṛpali*, *Uṛpali* iguana, *kosoy*, *kUsoy* soot, etc.

5. Some of the vowels occurring in the Muria words seem to represent the original Dravidian sounds, e.g. *ad* she, that, *accon* that much, *accarle* so much (cf. *DED* 1), *aṭṭ-* to cook (cf. *DED* 60), *ā-* to be (cf. *DED* 282), *āki* leaf (cf. *DED* 284), *id* this (cf. *DED* 351), *iga* here, *igaḍor* man of this place, *ī*, to give (cf. *DED* 2138), *un-(uṭ-)* to drink (cf. *DED* 516), *ūng-* to swing (intr.) (cf. *DED* 629), *pēn* god (cf. *DED* 3635), *pon* to flow (saliva etc.) (cf. *DED* 3658), *tol* skin (cf. *DED* 2937), etc.

But variations in the Muria vowels are also quite common. The

change of short *e* and *o* in Muria and the Northern Gondi dialects has been already pointed out by us in *CVGD* (p. 78). In some pan-Dravidian Muria words *o* has been retained, but forms like *berhor* big man, is rare in Muria. The normal forms in Muria are *bars*-to grow, *barhor marr* eldest son (see *CVGD* 2346-7 and *DED* 3613). Length of Dravidian vowels has been fairly intact in the pan-Dravidian Muria words, although there are some cases in our material where a shortening of long vowels, or the opposite case, has been recorded, e.g. Mu etc. *urs-* to plant, fix a post, but Ta. *ūṉru* to be fixed (*DED* 650), and Mu etc. *ōr-* to break (intr.), but Ta. *oṭi* to break, *uṭai* to break as pot bursts (*DED* 799). The peculiar palatal combination *ya*, *yā* and *ña*, *ñā* to be found in some South Dravidian languages[1] have been mostly changed to *ē* in Muria, e.g. Ta. *yāṭu*, Mu *ēṭ* (*i*) goat, Ta. *ñanṭu*, *ñenṭu*, Mu *ēṭe* crab, Ta. *yāru*, Mu *ēr* water, etc. The initial *y-* mentioned above seems to have been preserved in some words in some of the Northern Gondi dialects, e.g. Tr *yēṭi*, W Ph *yeṭi* goat (*CVGD* 376).

6. The final auxiliary *-u* to be found in many Dravidian languages is usually absent in Muria and other dialects of Gondi, e.g. Ta. *nāṭu*, Te. *nāḍu*, Kui *nāju*, Mu etc. *nār* village: Te. Kui *mīnu*, Ta. *mīṉ*, Mu etc *mīn* fish, etc. But an auxiliary *-i* has been retained in some Muria words particularly in its Eastern dialect, cf. *āl*, *āli* pipal tree (*CVGD* 142, *DED* 324), *nēl*, *nēli* field (*CVGD* 2056, *DED* 2374), *pīn*, *pīni* cold (*CVGD* 2270, *DED* 3322), *marr* (*i*), pl. *mark* son (*CVGD* 2713, *DED* 3901), etc. In the Abujhmaṛ dialect of Maṛia Gondi both *-i* and *u*, and in Koya only *-u*, are used more commonly as the optional auxiliary final vowel. Examples from Abujhmaṛ dialect: *nas*(*i*), pl. *nasku* sinew, *gutkāl* (*i*) ankle, *lēnj* (*i*), *lēnj*(*u*) moon, *ēr*(*i*) water, *trās* (*i*) snake, *garum*(*i*) nest inside anthill, *pāk*(*i*), pl. *pākin* heap of paddy, *citral*(*i*) spotted deer, *kākar*, pl. *kākasku* crow, *maynal*(*i*) meyna bird, *veddur*(*i*), pl. *veddurk*(*u*) bamboo, *bērel*(*i*) banyan tree, *āl*(*i*) pipal tree, *tār*(*i*) toddy palm, *lasun*(*i*) garlic, *ancar*(*i*), pl. *ancāsk* woman, *ma*ˀ*com*(*i*), *ma*ˀ*com lāṭi* fishing hook, *gāgir*(*i*) earthen vessel for carrying water, *aṛ*(*i*) path, *moros*(*i*) rope, *mesel*(*i*) whetstone, *eṭeṛ*(*i*) sickle, *eṭeṛ-te* koya cut with sickle, *eṛpunj*(*i*), pl. *eṛpusk* shoe, *kulum*(*i*) pus, *koṛiyaṛ* (*i*), pl. *koṛiyask* daughter-in-law, *rāv* (*i*) spirit living in the mountain, *ānal*(*i*), pl. *ānasku* spirit living in house *kurs*(*u*) deer, *eṛji* pl. *eṛsku*, *ḍuval*(*i*) tiger, *marn*(*u*) tree, *ar*(*i*) bread, (pl.) *kelk*(*u*) hair, *pungak*-(*u*) flowers,

[1] See T. Burrow, "Dravidian Studies V", *B.S.O.A.S.* vol. XI, part 3.

neyk(u) dogs, etc. Examples from Koya are: *ar(u)* path, *eṛj(u)*, pl. *eṛjk* bear, *korr(u)*, pl. *korrk* fowl, *kūj(u)* crowbar, *pal(u)* milk, *goḍ(u)*, pl. *goḍk* cow, etc. An auxiliary *a* has been recorded in a few cases in this position. e.g. Mu *tōl, tōla* skin, Ko *āp, āpa* brinjal, etc.

7. In Muria the diphthong *-ai* which occurs finally in some Dravidian languages and dialects is usually pronounced *-ay*: *Mu kay* hand, Ta. *kai*, Mu *nay* , Ta. *nāy, nāi* dog, etc. Although diphthongs occur in very few native Muria words (*paroi, parroi* name) they are quite common in loanwords from Indo-Aryan, e.g. *aur* another, *amaus tihar* a festival falling on the dark-moon night, *gă̄or* (*gōr*) bison, *ceit* the month of caitra (*March-April*), *nauker* servant, *paur* (*jap*) siyaṛi tree, *vaisak* the month of vaisākha (April-May), *baeral* deaf, *bāis dēṭi* kind of tuber, *beiñar gohoḍ* a multitude of traders (i.e. the Banjaras), *bhai, bai* brother, *mauṛ*, pl. *mauhk* cock's comb, etc. The tendency to simplify a diphthong with the help of *y* or *v* is sometimes found also to influence the loanwords, e.g. *aytvar-* Sunday, *kamayki-* to earn one's livelihood, *ṭoyli* a kind of string instrument called *ṭoela toyla* bag (< Hi. *thaili*), *bilay* cat, *bihav* marriage, *bayrāgi* mendicant (< *bairāgi*), etc. The English word *powder* is changed to *pāḍer*, and *time* to *ṭayem.*

But the Abujhmaṛ dialect of Gondi has the diphthong *-ai* in a few native Dravidian words, e.g. *talai* head, *renḍ talain* two heads (Mu *tal* (1) *a-n*), *talaitan kelk* hair of head (Mu *taladan kelk id.*), *vaṛai* one (non-masc.), etc. Another diphthong found in this dialect is *-ei* which is perhaps a variant of *-ai.* It has been found to be used optionally and is sometimes simplified to *-i* or *-e*. Examples are: *koṛ(ei)*, pl. *kohku* horn, *tokaṛ* (*ei, i*), pl. *tokahku* tail, *tōṛ* (*ei, i*), pl. *tōhku* large feather, *nīṛ* (*ei, i*) ashes, *koṛ(ei)*, pl. *kohku* fowl, (*h*) *aṛe* (*i*) road, *kūpaṛe*(*i*) top-knot, *kuyaṛei* stream, *vanjyaṛei* tongue, *kehmarei* door, etc. The word *eppoṛe* soft broom has been recorded without *i* of the diphthong *-ei.* It is likely that in the Abujhmaṛ dialect the diphthongs developed as a result of the addition of *-i* to the forms ending in *-a* and *-e*.

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SOME NOTES ON MANIPURI.

By D. N. SHANKARA BHAT,

(Communicated through Dr. Nilmadhav Sen)

1. There are about a hundred different languages belonging to the Tibeto-Burman family spoken in the northern and north-eastern parts of India. The number of persons speaking one or the other of these languages is a little over three million, which is, incidentally, less than one per cent of India's total population. There are only seven languages with their speakers numbering a hundred thousand or more, and Manipuri tops this list, as it is spoken by nearly 640 thousand persons, and is understood by a few thousand more. It has a written literary tradition dating back to about 1500 A.D. The natives call it the *məytəy lon* (also spelled *meitei*).

2. It would be necessary to set up the following phonemes for this language:

vowels :	i	ə	u
	e	a	o
Consonants :	p	t	k
	ph	th	kh
	b	d	g
	m	n	ŋ
	v	l	y
	j	r	
	c	s	h

3. There is most probably a three-fold distinction of tone for which the two tonemes, high-falling /ˊ/ and low-falling /ˋ/ may be set up.

4. Vowels show three non-contrastive degrees of length: short, slightly long and long. As to their destribution, the vowels *i*, *ə* and *u* behave in one way and the vowles *e*, *a* and *o* in another.

5. The vowels *i*, *ə* and *u* have the long allophones [i:], [ə:] and [u:] respectively when followed by a single consonant and *ə*. They have the slightly long allophones [i·], [ə·] and [u·] respectively in the word-final position and the short allophones elsewhere.

Examples :

(a) long: *phəbə* to be good, *phubə* to beat, *śibe* to die; (b) slightly long: *amə* one, *umaybi* kite, *cəru* straw; (c) short: *phəklaj* fence, *hidak* medicine, *pujjav* big drum.

6. The vowels *e*, *a* and *o* have the long allophones [e:], [a:] and [o:] respectively when (a) followed by *ə* in the next syllable and (b) in monosyllabic words; the slightly long allophones [e·], [a·] and [o·] respectively occur (a) in word-final position (except in monosyllabic words) and (b) in the first syllable of words of (C) VCV pattern, provided, the second vowel is other than *ə*; they have the short allophones elsewhere.

Examples :

(a) long: *tebə* to be tame, *habə* to hawk, *obə* to vomit; *ten* arrow, *ka* room, *kok* head; (b) slightly long: *menja* five, *cəvpo* a proper name, *ine* my father's sister; *yari* gum, *kori* copper; (c) *cejkup* bran, *pambom* arm, *khoynin* nightingale.

7. Among the consonants, voiced and voiceless (unaspirated) stops show very little of contrast between them. The former very rarely occur in the initial or final position, and medially also, they mostly have voiceless consonants occurring in the immediately preceding syllable, an environment in which voiceless stops very rarely occur (see 15 below).

8. The consonants *j* and *c* are voiced and voiceless palatal affricates respectively. The former is alveolar intervocally when followed by the vowel *a*. It freely alternates with a voiced fricative intervocally, which is alveolar before *a* and palatal before other vowels. The voiceless affricate *c* has a *y*-glide before the vowel *e*. The glide occurs with *r* also before *e*, but not when the *r* occurs in a consonant cluster.

9. The following items may be considered as evidence for setting up two phonemes of tone, high-falling /ʹ/ and low-falling /`/. The nformant, however, was not very consistant in this respect, and hence, an attempt to mark it elsewhere in this paper is purposely avoided.

(a) *ləʹy* to swing round, *ləy* to purchase, *l`əy* to dwell; (b) *pi* to give, *ki* to fear, *ś`i* to die.

There are, however, quite a number of pairs indicating a two-fold tonal contrast:

khən to sneeze, *kh`ən* to think; *phəm* to be poisonous, *ph`em* to sit; *pét*·

to be content, *pét* to be soft; *`in* to feed, *in* to push; *lam* to stretch oneself, *l`am* to be hungry.

10. All verbal roots are monosyllabic. They may be one of the following four types:

CV	ca	to eat
CVC	kək	to cut
V	i	to write
VC	uk	to bite

11. Any consonant except *b*, *d*, *j*, *g*, and *r* can occur as the first consonant of a root; however, only *p*, *t*, *k*, *m*, *n*, *j*, *v* and *y* can occur as root-final consonants.

12. There are a number of derivative suffixes that can occur after a root. The following will illustrate it clearly.

ca	to eat
cathok	to eat by force
cakhət	to begin to eat
cathə	to eat continuously
caśin	to eat in
cari	to go on eating
carə	to eat off
camən	to eat too much
cathət	to be eaten by acid
caphət	to be eaten by water
cahən	to make to eat
carək	to have already eaten

13. Some of these suffixes show variations in their shape depending on the type of root that precedes them. Thus the suffixes *khət* to begin to........, *thok*........by force and *śin*........in show the following three sets of forms:

set I	set II	set III
khət	kət	gət
thok	tok	dok
śin	cin	jin

14. The alternants grouped under the sets II and III occur after roots having an initial aspirated sound or a fricative, and those of set

I occur after the remaining roots (i.e., after roots having a vowel, unaspirated stop, nasal, *y*, *v*, *l* or *c* initially). Again, alternants grouped under set II occur after roots having a final voiceless stop and those of set III occur elsewhere.

Examples :

	set I		set II
təkthok	to rub off	thəktok	to drink off
yatthok	to cut off	hattok	to kill off
kəkkhət	to begin to cut	khəkkət	to begin to stop
yatśin	to cut in	hatcin	to kill in
lakśin	to come in	thəkcin	to drink in

	set I		set III
ithok	to write off	śidok	to die off
vaythok	to hire off	haydok	to drive off
pathok	to read off	phadok	to catch off
jəmthok	to win off	śəmdok	to join off
taśin	to fall in	thajin	to send in
iśin	to write in	śijin	to die in
yəjśin	to look in	həjjin	to ask in
vayśin	to hire in	khayjin	to take in

	set II		set III
thəktok	to drink off	thəmdok	to put off
həkket	to begin to carve	həngət	to begin to ask
khəkcin	to stop in	hajin	to sell in
hatcin	to kill in	khənjin	to think in

15. It can thus be noted that there are two independent morphophonemic alternations functioning here, (a) an alternation between aspirated and unaspirated sounds ——a case of non-contiguous dissimilation, and (b) an alternation between voiced and voiceless sounds—a case of contiguous assimilation.

16. There are some suffixes which show the second change only. Thus the infinitive suffix is *pə* after voiceless consonants and *bə* elsewhere.

17. A number of suffixes show an *r* ∽ *l* alternation in their initial consonant:

rək ∽ lək to have already...........

ri ∽ li to........continuously

Forms with an initial *r* occur after roots ending in *v*, *y* or a vowel, and those with an initial *l* occur after roots ending in a stop or a nasal.

Examples:

thəmlək	to have already put	payrək	to have already flown
yənlək	to have ,, sent	həvrək	to have ,, begun
nəmli	to win continuously	cari	to eat continuously
thərjli	to knock ,,	iri	to write ,,
phəgli	to pull ,,	thiri	to count ,,
khədli	to scrape ,,	hoyri	to drive ,,

18. When followed by a vowel, root-final *k* gets elided and the root-final *n* becomes l.

thəkpə	to drink	thəmde	did not drink
nokpə	to laugh	noəmde	did not laugh
konbə	to bend	koləmmi	bent
panbə	to rule	paləmme	had ruled

19. There are a number of finite verbal suffixes such as *y* present, *i* imperfect, *e* perfect, *r* continuous, *rəm* past, *roy* future negative, *de* negative and *gəni* future which can occur after the verbal bases discussed above. The following are a few of the finite forms that can be obtained by using them.

present	cay	eats
present continuous	cari	is eating
past	carəmmi	ate
future	cagəni	will eat
present perfect	care	has eaten
past perfect	carəmme	had eaten
present negative	cade	does not eat
future negative	caroy	will not eat
past negative	carəmde	did not eat
present perfect negative	cadre	has not eaten
past perfect negative	carəmde	had not eaten
present continuous negative	cadri	is not eating
past continuous negative	carəmdri	was not eating
past perfect continuous negative	carəmdre	had not been eating
unreal past	carəmroy	might not have eaten

20. Kinship terms are to be necessarily preceded by one of the three pronominal prefixes to indicate possession. The prefixes are *i* my, *nə* your and *mə* his or her.

ica	my son	ima	my mother
nəca	your son	nəma	your mother
məca	his son	məma	his mother

21. The prefixes also occur before a number of other nouns such as those denoting body parts, (e.g. *ləy* tongue, *mit* eye, *na* ear), or certain possessions (e.g. *phi* cloth, *yum* house, *min* name, *huy* dog), but their occurrence in such cases is not obligatory.

22. The counting system is interesting in that the decimal system appears to have been imposed on an earlier system of counting by twenties. The root *kun* is used to indicate twenty and *phu* its multiples.

ani	two	nipuy	forty
ahum	three	humphu	sixty
məri	four	məriphu	eighty

Other decimals are derived by adding *thra* to the above forms (*tera* is ten).

kunthra	thirty	humputhra	seventy
məriphuthra	ninenty		

There is a special term *yenkhuy* to denote fifty. The root *ca* ∽ *cə* with the numbers one to nine indicates the hundreds: *camə* one hundred, *cəni* two hundreds, *cəhum* three hundreds etc.

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SOME FOLK TEMPLES OF HUGHLY DISTRICT

By ADRIS BANERJI

The small temple tradition discussed in these pages, was undoubtedly a minor episode in the vast and long history of Indian architecture. Evolved from folk habits, it rose to classic stage and when all other official styles had disappeared, it had the virility to survive as the domestic architecture of the lower economic group as my tours in West Bengal, Orissa and Assam have shown. The style originated from there. These types of thatched huts and *caṇḍī-maṇḍapas* are still being erected and is likely to be built in the future. The aesthetic values of this tradition are indeed great. Following the extinction of royal dynasties and their nobility on the advent of Islam, when the stone tradition fell into disuse, a rural architecture of wood[1], mud, thatch and bamboos, tranformed into brick and laterite thrived for about a millenium. It is the one or two room huts of the humble villagers, which was adopted with more or less finish and elaboration as places of worship.

One such temple exists at Bāñśberiā, only 43 kilometers from Calcutta. One at Kāmārpārā near Chinsurah, the third at Shāhganj and a group at Guptipārā. These are however a few of the many which lie scattered in every hamlet and large villages like Mahānād, Siñgur, Serampur etc.[2] Parenthetically, it may be noted that the name Guptipārā is not derived from the *vaidya* surname 'Gupta' but a secret place. Towards the middle of the 17th century, the jungle tracts around Bāñsberiā came into prominence when the square of Pātulī was granted 27 *parganās* with the title of "Chaudhury" (a revenue collector) by Emperor Shāhjehān. The succeeding generations made Bāñśberiā their capital. The temple of Anantadeva or Vishṇu-Nārāyaṇa was built by Rāmeśvara of this family in c. 1679-80 A.D., when the title of Rājāmahāśaya" was conferred on them by Aurangzebe-Alamgir. It is located in the old *Garhbāṭi* of the family, within double moats. The material is well-burnt bricks and erected on a

[1] There is a *Candīmaṇḍapa* at Aṇtput which is a very notable example of the carpenters' art. Sri Hiten Sanyal informs me that there is a fine carved door at Kutulpur in Hughly district.

[2] Sudhir Kumar Mitra - *Hughly Jelār Itihāsa O Bañga Samāj*, vols. I and II, pp. 592-1136 and the plates.

jagati or the stylobate with a *garbhagṛiha* surrounded by a verandah all around. Since it is closed up or rather bricked up on the northern side like many temples of Visṇupur, it is a moot point whether it was meant for *pradakṣina* or not. It is of the *chār-chālā* order, over whose roof there is a *cuḍā*.[1] It is octagonal in shape and the roof is not pyramidal like those of Visṇupur, but sloping.

The temple faces east, with two squat massive pillars of the type that we find in the mosque of Zāfar Khān Ghāzi at Trivenī, or in the laterite temple at Gārui, in the Burdwan district. The difference lies in the material. There are similar pillars on the southern and northern sides being equally ornate. The soffits of the engrailed arches, as well as the outer walls of the *cudā*, are elaborately ornamented in dull ochre colour over a white background. Only the western side has no such arrangement because it has been restored with modern bricks. The motifs are either geometric or floral or both; and lack the spirit and the fine story-telling character of the pillars. Above them is a slightly projecting cornice convex in form, above which are two parallel rows of square panels with intervening pilasters in the form of a crescent, probably to balance the design of the convex cornice below and the curve of the roof above. (Fig. 1.) To accentuate the main composition two pilasters have been placed on both flanks of the arched verandahs and two series of superimposed panels lie between them. On the southern side the extreme right pilaster has disappeared due to a later repair. For studying the applied sculptures, therefore, we have to fall back on the six central pillars and two each on the eastern, southern and northern sides.

In design the central pillars are generally angular. On octagonal bases, we have a sextadecagon section above, followed by two circular sets of mouldings. It is these which are sculpturesque. All are burnt clay plaques of various sizes. Even the 'false' *jāli* plaques between the first and third circular bands are cleverly contrived and marvels of technical skill. They are reminiscent of the beautiful stone perforated screens of the stone cutter's art of Sārnāth and of the Lāṭa country, under the Caulukyas and their descendants who worked under their Turco-Afghan masters and produced masterpieces of tombs, mosques etc. The themes of the decorative sculptures are

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[1] The design in general and specially the type of *cuda* is exactly similar to the Rāmachandrajis temple at Guptipārā, reported to have been erected by Rājā Harisacandra Rāya of Sheoraphuli, having curved corners.

from the *Rāmāyaṇa*, *Mahābhārata* and *Kṛiṣṇaililā*. Thus Fig. 2 depict below half and full blown lotus medallions and the incident of breaking the bow of Hara (Śiva) possessed by Jaṇaka (*hara-dhanu bhaṅga*) by youthful Rāma. The churning of milk by Yaśodā, the naughty child Kṛiṣṇa tied to a tree, are to be found in Fig. 3; while a plaque of *Rāsamaṇḍala* occurs as a circular medallion in Fig. 4, reminding one of the same subject at Visṇupur and *sarvotabhadra* temple at Rāṇakpur in Barmer district. As far as the themes and treatment are concerned, there is a wonderful affinity between the revivalist movement in Mewār and the survival in Bengal, with the exception of such differences as are due to material, distance and artistic spirit. Dancing scenes, *mithuna* couples are to be found in Fig. 5. Paurānic mythology are also not absent. Thus below a dancing couple flanked by floral panels we see Bramhā on his Swan, Śiva on his Bull, Viṣṇu on Garuḍa and Indra on his Airāvata (Fig. 6). At the centre, in a large rectangular panel within a multifoil arch is to be seen *mahiṣā-sura-marddīnī*. Scenes from *Rāmāyaṇa*, though not predominant as in the Kāmārpārā and Shāhgānj temples, are also met with (Fig. 7).

There are two other temples in its neighbourhood, and several others surveyed by Professor D. McCutchion of Jadavpur University, which though not so magnificently ornate like the Bāñśberiā or the Añtpur temples, bear terracotta scenes on the top of the multifoil entrance doors, encased by the perpendicular parallel supports of the concave cornice below the tortoise-shaped edges of the cārcālā roof and rectangular panels on top and either sides. The general design is restrained. It is a single cella type with doors on each side [(Shāhganj) Fig. 8 & 9], with a domical roof below a cārcālā hut-shaped style, with a second storey above of the same design. The *navaratna* temple at Kāmārpārā, however is different (Fig. 10). It has a lower cārcāla roof with a solid cube intervening between the upper and lower roofs. Only the cube has been converted into a square room with a door on one side as in Mahānād. On four corners there are four *ratnas*, which are repeated on the upper roof with a slightly bigger *ratna* at the centre. In front, we have a verandah supported by three engrailed arches, on two pillars and two pilasters. The soffits of the arches are decorated with terracotta ornaments (Fig .11). Before entering into a discussion about this applied sculptures, sheer artistry in mud; it would be worthwhile to attempt a survey of the temple types found in the district.

This analysis results in dividing the temples into three classes: (1) hut shaped; (2) special; (3) *Ratna* temples and finally the (4) plain modern temples. In the first division the āt-cāla seems to have been comparatively popular. To this class belongs the temple of Lakṣmī Nārāyaṇa or Janārdana (S.E. 1648=1726 A.D.). The Śiva temple at Paunān, the two temples at Dhaniākhāli[1], Somāspur, Candraśekhara and Bhuvaneśvara temples at Mahānād, Radhāgovindajīs temple at Haripāl, the celebrated Tārakeśvara temple, the seven shrines at Siṅgur, Śiva temple at Chopā, Bṛindāvanchandra's temple at Guptipārā, Madangopāla temple at Gosvāmīpāḍā, Śiva temple at Gulitā, Rādhāballabh temple at Boinchee etc.

In the second class or special type are the double *do-chālā* or" Jor Bāṅgla temple of Chitanyadeva at Guptīpārā, the *Dolmañca* at Tārakeśvara, Haṁseśvari at Bāñśberiā, Viśālākṣi temple at Ināthnagar, the temple at Āñtpur, Lālji' temple at Mahānād, Venīmādhav Mandira at Triveṇī, Rādhā Govinda temple at Guḍābāḍī and Saptaratha temple at Boinchee etc. This last temple bears some affinities with the two temples at Baidyapur, the difference lying in the fact that the former is cylindrical the latter is conical.

The third class of temples was evolved from *āt-chālā* hut-shaped type, by the addition of one or more towers or *ratnas*. Ananta-Vāsudeva temple at Bāñśberiā, Navaratna at Digśui, Ramacandra at Guptipārā and others, Śiva temple at Gopināthapur, Joḍāmandira at Boḍāgadi, the temples at Somāspur, the Dol-mañca at Ālā are some examples. It had been correctly inferred by many others and as well as by the present writer that the hut-shaped type originated from domestic architecture of rural Bengal. Therefore the *ratna* style was a logical development of the *āṭ-chālā* type with greater practice, sophistication and versimilitude. If any justification for the above inference was necessary, it has been supplied by the flat-roofed hall-like temples, (sometimes with a verandah in front) which were erected from 1757 A.D. onwards. Some of these are Rādhā Govinda temple at Āmnām, Rādhākānta temple at Bāsyuyā, Madanmohan temple at Rudrānī, the Thākur bāḍi at Belmuḍi etc.

The Brahmamayi temple at Mahānād, And Annapurṇā temple at Telinipāḍā show a stylistic development from the *āṭ-chālā* type. In this class the *ratna* temples had a solid cube of differing elevations between the two roofs. No earlier temples show any departure

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[1] One of them is called *Buḍo Śiver mandira.*

from this practice which became stereotyped by usage and practice. Many such examples can be seen in the streets and lanes of Calcutta. But in these two temples, we find a rectangular or square room with door on the front side. The Mahānād temple was erected in A.D. 1829 (that is Śaka year 1751), only a decade before the Mutiny by Śrī Krişṇacandra of the *Sadgopa* caste. There is a liṅgam on the first floor called Haṁseśvara, while the ground floor has an image of Kāli and four phalluses at four corners. The temple of Annapurṇā at Telinipārā, has a peristyled verandah in front. It is possibly the latest example of the style.

The applied sculptures of terracotta possess three qualities. The aesthetics, the themes and representations. It was a folk art which received a fine flowering, vivid and varied, in intellectual, political and social climates that were unpropitious. Their behaviour impresses us with the fact that the experimental stage with the material, colour, chiaroscuro and linear composition having reached their optimum, attained a variety worthy of Mattissè and Piccaso. There are the same vibrant lines, the identical dullness of forms, warmth and plasticity that the *paṭa* drawings of West Bengal display. Unlike them, however, the emphasis is on the decorative. The figures range in all their luminosity of deep red ochre against the background of whitewashed walls and shadows of the overhanging eves of the curved roofs, amidst greenness of jungle, mangoe groves and paddy fields. The figures are in varied poses and postures. Faces are like flowers, like goblins, crude and rough like those of ordinary workmen. The men are gallants with a degree of bravado, bullies, workers performing their manual labours, soldiers, commoners, dancing girls, courtesans, ladies etc. In fact the art is intimately concerned with the poetry and prose of country life in the 17th and 18th centuries of the Christian eras. Indeed the lyrical qualities, the vitality and dramatic element in the compositions evoke and stimulate the public imagination and invigorate the mind, due to the chromatic values having been used to accentuate the symbolism. Their basal themes are furnished by the *Mahābhārata* and *Rāmāyaṇa* with miniatures from the *Purāṇas* thrown in.

There are other elements in this folk art. A broad humanism and liberal approach, which like contemporary Rājasthānī miniatures included secular lives and customs, small trivilities of day to day life and commonplace incidents are integrated with highest philoso-

phies. The wisdom of the course is undeniable. In this cultural trait we are compelled to recognize the evidences of survival of the best tradition of the ancient Indian plastic activity. They are reminiscent of the 'Dancing Girl' of Harāppā, the huge terracotta plaques of Ahicchatrā, Sārnāth, Pāhārpur and Nālanda. They remind us of Tipperāh, Sonatāpal and the Indian colonial art in South East Asia. They remind us of the epic in stone of Bhārhut and Śānchi, finally the monochrome lithic murals of Mahāvalīpuram, Konārak and Bhuvaneśvara.

The characters wear contemporary costumes, they depict current games, means of transport, wars, trades and commerce, crafts, jewelleries and arms. Indigenous boats of different designs, *Chips*, *Bajrās*, sea-going huge vessels, *ratha* like bullock carts, furniture, horse drawn carriages, palanquins; all are there for any historian to reconstruct the economic life of the centuries. These are their greatest attraction along with principles of contrasts, voids and solids. It would be a heresay indeed for a moment to think that the craftsmen were aware of these principles of modern architecture. But, just as the *symmetria frisca* originated in India, in the centuries immediately preceding the birth of Christ, so we meet with the actual application of these principles in a primitive form.

The real architect being the solar orb and its rays. This idea again is of great antiquity in India. To exploit the brilliance of the tropical Sun, the Indian architect created a rich and variegated decorative art to beautify their monuments. They are as old as Bhārhut, Sāñchi, Amarāvatī.

The accents are not on the verticals as in the Pre-Islamic period, but on horizontals. There is a perfect harmony between the trabeate and arcuate architectures. A characteristic which they share with the plastic activity of an area, remote from them, but with whose people they came in contact in the heyday of Mughal imperialism. While *mekhalās*, *antarapatras* and *pallavikās* are absent, the emphasis was on the deeper incisions, projections and recessions, light and deep shadows. The decorations are bizarre indicating not only rich development but also formalization of traditional aesthetic idioms of expressions. It was an ornate art rich in tradition, patronized by late mediaeval society, in an unpropitious political and cultural climate. The mediaeval society referred to above in the 15th to 17th centuries A.D., was secular, and oligarchic. Its two foci were

Mughal *tālukdārs* and the plutocrats that thrived on the riverine commerce of the area. Just as in *Rājasthān*, the feudal lords, the *śresṭhīs* and the *sārthavāhas* played no insignificant role, so on the banks of the Bhāgirathī, Dāmodara etc., a new culture grew up in settled times.[1]

[1]Copyright of all photographs belong to the Archæological Survey of India.



Fig. 1. General view of Ananta-Vāsudeva temple at Bāṅśberiā, Dt. Hughly

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

FIG. 2. The eastern side of the temple showing *Hara-dhanu-bhanga*. *Copyright. Archaeological Survey of India.*

FIG. 3. Another view of the eastern side showing scenes from Kriṣṇ līlā, a *ratha* drawn by bulls, a tānjām and Europeans.

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

FIG. 4. A plaque showing Rāsamaṇḍala. *Copyright. Archaeological Survey of India.*

FIG. 5. Details of the Bāṅśberiā temple showing dancing and *mithuna* couples, etc. *Copyright. Archaeological Survey of India.*



FIG. 6. Bramhā, Śiva, Mahiṣāsura-marddinī, Viṣṇu and Indra.

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

FIG. 7. Scenes from *Rāmāyana*. *Copyright, Archaeological Survey of India.*



FIG. 8. The temple at Shāhganj dated in Śaka 1647.

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

FIG. 9. Details of the decorations above the entrance showing scenes from *Rāmāyaṇa*
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

FIG. 10. *Pañcaratna* temple at Kāmārpārā. Dt. Hughly.
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

FIG. 11. Sculptures above the entrance showing in between *Rāmāyaṇa* scenes, Mahiṣāsura-marddinī and Śiva etc.

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Journal of the Asiatic Society, 1967
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A JUDICIARY AT ODDS WITH THE EXECUTIVE—THE CALCUTTA SUPREME COURT AND THE BENGAL ADMINISTRATION, 1781-1833.

By CHITTARANJAN SINHA

The Supreme Court was set up in Calcutta in accordance with the Regulating Act of 1773, by a Charter of George III issued on 26th March 1774. It superseded the Mayor's Court which had been functioning at Calcutta since 1753. The main idea behind the creation of the Supreme Court had been to purify the administration of justice (according to English law and procedure) in the British settlement of Calcutta by creating a Court which could function independently of the Company's Executive. It was to be consituted by persons who had been professional lawyers for at least five years and their appointment and removal vested with the Crown. The Judges of the Mayor's Court (known as the Mayor and the Aldermen), on the other hand, used to be junior servants of the Company who were without any legal training and whose tenure depended on the pleasure of the Company's Government. Thus, the Supreme Court was better equipped to secure a fair and impartial administration of justice than its predecessor. Though primarily designed to administer justice to persons of British origin residing in Bengal, it was also intended to afford protection to the Indians against the high-handedness of the Company's servants.

The Court's jurisdiction extended to all British subjects* and the persons employed by them, to persons "directly or indirectly" in the service of the Company, and to any Indian living outside Calcutta, if he submitted voluntarily to the jurisdiction of the Court, in a suit instituted against him by a British subject, when the cause of action exceeded Rs. 500/-.

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*It may be recalled that the territory forming the City of Calcutta was regarded as Crown's territory ever since the purchase of the villages of Kalikata, Sutanti and Govindpur (which formed the nucleus for the metropolis that developed subsequently) from the Nawab of Bengal towards the end of the 17th century. Indians living in this territory were also considered subjects of the Crown. They had, therefore, been amenable to the Mayor's Court and became automatically so to its successor-the Supreme Court.

The Charter of 1774, which defined the jurisdiction of the Court was, however, not clear on certain issues. This became the source of a bitter conflict between the Court and the Company's administration about which much has been written.

The controversy arose chiefly from two issues on which the provisions were not clear. First, it was not specifically stated whether the Company's servants were answerable to the Court for acts done in their official capacity. The Bengal Administration asserted that the Court had no right to question any of its activities and its servants were immune from the jurisdiction of the Court for all acts done in discharge of their duty. The Court refused to accept this claim and they were probably right in doing so. There were many provisions in the Regulating Act which indicated that it had been intended to establish an impartial control over the vagaries and excesses of the officials of the Government. The Charter had expressly provided that the Court was authorised to take cognizance of all Civil and Criminal cases in which the Company's employees were involved, without drawing a distinction between acts done in their public or private capacities. Hence the court regarded all servants of the Company, (Indians and British alike) as answerable to them for any acts, whether public or private. Applying this reasoning, the Indians Law Officers of the Company's Courts, the Kazis and Muftis, were considered as accountable to the Court for acts done in discharge of their office. Thus in 1778, in the case of Nadra Begum (regarding partition of certain property at Patna), the Kazi and Mufti of the Adalat (Civil Court) attached to the Patna Council,* were called upon by the Supreme Court to answer for their official actions in the case, in obedience to the Patna Council. The Company's Government described Supreme Court's exercise of jurisdiction in the above case (famous as the Patna case) as completely illegal.

The amenability of the zamindars to the Court's authority formed another bone of contention between it and the Government. The Supreme Court had been allowed jurisdiction over persons either "directly or indirectly" in the service of the Company. Having contracted to secure revenue for the Company's Government, the zamindars were considered by the Court as fitting the category of persons

* Between 1774 ahd 1778 the Civil judicial administration in the districts had been entrusted to six Provincial Councils of Revenue which had succeeded to the functions of District Collectors.

"indirectly employed" by the Company. On this issue matters reached an ugly climax in the Kashijura case in 1779, in which the Government resisted, with its own force, the Court's process against the zamindar of Kashijura and generally instructed all the zamindars not to submit to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.

Matters having reached a crisis, Parliament was obliged to intervene. By Act 21 Geo III, Cap. 63, of 1780 (popularly known as the Act of Settlement) the Court's jurisdiction was redefined. The preamble and provisions of the Act make it obvious that in the preceding conflict between the Court and the Company, Parliament had given a clear verdict in favour of the latter. By it the Court's authority was curtailed in order to remove the existing areas of conflict.

Thus by Section 8 of the Act, the Court was forbidden to exercise any authority in matters concerning revenue. Section 9 declared the zamindars to be exempt from the Court's jurisdiction. By section 24, judicial officers (Indian as well as British) were made immune from any action in the Supreme Court for acts done in their official capacity. This exemption also extended to persons acting under the orders of any judicial officer. Obviously, this provision had been directly suggested by the Patna case mentioned above.

One of the most significant provisions of the Act of Settlement was that which, for the first time, extended Parliamentary recognition to the judicial system organised and maintained by the Company. By Section 21, the Sadr Diwani Adalat was recognised as the Company's highest tribunal of Civil justice, competent to decide all appeals and references from the subordinate courts. Its judgements were to be final and conclusive except in cases of Rs. 50,000/- and above, when a further appeal was to lie to the King-in-Council (commonly known as the Privy Council).

Its jurisdiction thus curtailed and defined, the Supreme Court was expected to function in accord with the machinery of Company's administration. At the same time, it was anticipated that the Company's administration in the interior would function without any hindrance from the court.

That it worked out to be so in actual practice too in the post-1781 period, is a presumption commonly held among scholars of Indian legal history. An intensive research into the contemporary official records, however, does not justify the same conclusion. Although such scenes of open conflict between the Court and the Government, as

those of the pre-1781 period, did not recur, instances were not lacking in the period following the Act of Settlement, when the actions of one irritated or inconvenienced the functioning of the other. On many occasions the Government protested that the Court had exceeded its jurisdiction. The Court, on the other hand, complained that the Government had refused cooperation.

The first incident of this sort occured in 1793[1]. In that year, Mirza Mohammad a resident of Dacca had filed a civil suit for possession against another resident of Dacca, Agha Asee, (who was an Armenian Christian), in the local District Judge's Court. The Supreme Court allowed a petition of Agha Asee claiming exemption from the Dacca Judge's jurisdiction, on the ground that being a foreigner he could be answerable only to the Supreme Court. The Court accordingly directed the Plaintiff, Mirza Mohammad, to cease all proceedings against the Agha in the Dacca Court. Patterson, the Judge of Dacca, sought instruction from the Government, who in accordance with the advice of the Company's Attorney, directed him to proceed with the case without taking any notice of the Supreme Court's order.[2]

Under the terms of the Charter of 1774, the categories of persons over whom the Supreme Court's jurisdiction extended were, British subjects, persons employed by the Company or by any officer of His Majesty, and Indians voluntarily submitting to the Court's jurisdiction in cases against British subjects.[3] It is obvious that Agha Asee did not fit into either of the above classifications. The Government's defiance to the Court's order was, therefore, justified.

On several occasions, the Bengal Government was led to resist the processes of attachment or sale issued by the Supreme Court against properties situated outside the limits of Calcutta. The following examples illustrate the point.

Indians residing outside Calcutta could make themselves amenable to the jurisdiction. of the Supreme Court by election in a case instituted against him by a British subject.* From this permissive clause

[1] Case of *Mirza Mohammad vs. Agha Asee.* recorded in Bengal Revenue and Judicial consultations, 26th April 1993, Nos. 39-43.

[2] Revenue & Judicial Consultations, 26th April 1793, No. 43.

[3] No modification was made in this by the Act of 1780. It only declared the zamindars and Company's servants acting in official capacity to be exempt from the Court's authority.

* It may be recalled that for the purposes of the Supreme Court's jurisdiction, Indians living in Calcutta were also considered British subjects because Calcutta was Crown's territory.

parties losing or expecting to lose an action in one of the Company's Courts found an easy way of defeating the exertions of the Plaintiff.[1] The Defendant, anticipating the Decree against him in the District Court, transferred the whole of his property to one of his friends or relatives residing in Calcutta. By prior arrangement, the transferee, at once, (in collusion with the transferor), applied to the Supreme Court for attachment of the said property on the basis of the recently executed deed of transfer. The imposter transferor then made himself amenable to the Supreme Court by executing a bond before that Court. After that the latter admitted the claim of the fictitious transferee who had no difficulty in procuring an attachment which was granted by the Supreme Court as a matter of course. When the actual Creditor or claimant obtained his Decree from the local Judge's Court, he found the property of the Defendant under the encumbrance of Supreme Court's attachment. The Decree granted by the local court could not, therefore, be made effective.

This practice became prevalent in the Districts adjoining Calcutta, (such as Burdwan, Hooghly and 24 Parganas) because the Supreme Court was easily accessible to their inhabitants who could conveniently find out a friend or relative in Calcutta to collaborate with them in the fraud.

The case of *Gaya Ram Bose* vs *Ramjaya Baral*, for possession, was under trial before the Judge of Burdwan in 1794.[2] The Defendant anticipating the Decree against him in the Burdwan Court, manipulated the issue of an order of attachment over the lands in dispute from the Supreme Court, in favour of a resident of Calcutta. The Supreme Court's Sheriff executed the attachment on the spot. Thompson, the local District Judge referred the matter to the Government who in accordance with the advice of Advocate General, Burroughs,[3] directed Thompson to give notice to the Sheriff of the said property being already in the process of adjudication in the Burdwan Court and ask the Sheriff to vacate the attachment on that ground.[4] If the Sheriff did

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[1] Thompson, Burdwan Judge to Government, 5th June 1794, Criminal and Judicial Consultations, 13th June 1794, No. 7.

[2] Bengal Criminal and Civil Judicial Consultations, 13th June 1794, No. 6.

[3] Burrough's opinion is recorded under Criminal and Civil Judicial Consultations, 24th Oct. 1794. No. 10.

[4] Criminal and Civil Judicial Consultations, 24th Oct. 1794, No. 11.

not comply with this request Thompson was to proceed with the trial of the case without caring for the Sheriff's attachment[1].

The Government issued an identical order in the similar case of *Gour Mohan Chaudhry* vs *Harachandra Chaudhry*, when certain property under litigation in the Burdwan Civil Court had been attached and sold by the Sheriff.[2] The Burdwan Judge was directed to inform the Sheriff that any application from the purchaser (at the Sheriff's sale) for being put into the possession of the property could not be granted, until the contested right to the property had been finally determined by the Burdwan Court.

In the case of *Banarsi Ghosh*' vs. *Radha Mohan Ghosh*[3] certain disputed lands had been decreed in favour of the Plaintiff by the Judge of Hooghly. When on the Defendants manipulation the Supreme Court issued an attachment on the same property and the Sheriff started arranging its sale for the benefit of a party of Calcutta (in whose favour the attachment had been issued), the Government decided to withhold the conveyance of the lands to any prospective purchaser at the Sheriff's sale[4]. This order was in accordance with the Advocate General's view that the Sheriff's sale did not create any new title but merely conveyed the existing one to the purchaser[5]. As such, only a title which had been declared valid by a competent Court (of the Company) could be conveyed at the Sheriff's sale. The title of Radha Mohan Ghosh to the lands in question had been declared invalid by the Judge of Hooghly. Therefore, there was no question of such title being transferred to any one.

Thus in one case (that of Agha Asee) the Company's Government denied the assertion of jurisdiction by the Supreme Court, and in others, resisted the executions of the Court's processes where they tended to interfere with the Company's revenue and judicial administration. These cases had occured during the Governor-Generalships of Cornwallis and Shore.

But the Supreme Court had lost their earlier bite after their recent defeat (of 1780) in the dispute with the Government. Hence, instead of raking up another quarrel, they decided to appeal to the Company's

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1 Criminal and Civil Judicial Consultations, 24th Oct. 1794, No. 11

2 Bengal Civil Judicial Consultations, 11th Nov. 1796, No. 5.

3 Civil Judicial Consultations, 18th Nov. 1796, No. 14.

4 Civil Judiicial Consultaions, 18th Nov. 1796, No. 14.

5 *Ibid.*

administration for Cooperation. Wellesley, the new Governor-General who assumed office on 18th May 1798, was very responsive to the new approach. On a request from the Supreme Court he gave a pledge to extend all official assistance in the execution of the Court's processes.[1] Wellesley, did, in fact, inauguarate an area of amity and cooperation between the Supreme Court and the Bengal Administration, which was to last through the subsequent Governor-Generalships until the coming of Bentinck. Wellesley's attitude towards the king's Court must have been tempered by his liberal approach towards judiciary in general, which is apparent from his views on the independence of the Sadr Diwani Adalat, the Company's highest tribunal of justice[2]. He was also very friendly with Anstruther, the contemporary Chief Justice of the Supreme Court[3].

From 1800 onwards, a striking change is noticeable in the Bengal Government's attitude towards the Supreme Court. Henceforth the Administration toed the line that the Supreme Court was the only competent body to decide whether a particular person was subject to its jurisdiction or not, and that on no account were the local officers to obstruct the execution of its processes. The following instances illustrate the zeal of the Government to Cooperate with the Court.

In 1800 one Osborne, a British resident of Calcutta, obtained from the Supreme Court, the "Letter of Administration" to the estate of a certain Werber, deceased, whose property and assets had been held in the custody of the Judge of Dacca. Since Werber had been a resident of Dacca for some time past and being of Portugese origin could not be classified as a 'British Subject', the Dacca Judge asserted that he (Werber) could be amenable to the Dacca Court only, and that the Supreme Court had no jurisdiction over this case[4]. The assertion seemed fair. All the same the Government decided that the Supreme

[1] Civil Judicial Consultations, 24th Aug. 1798, Nos. 1 & 2.

[2] Wellesley had very strongly championed the separation of the Sadr Diwani Adalat from the Governor-General-in-Council (who had so far conducted its business). He had advocated for the Sadr Diwani Adalat to be constituted by independent whole-time Judges and a Chief Justice who should be "as nearly as possible, on the same level with the Chief Justice of Supreme Court". Wellesley to Dundas, 5th March 1800, *Wellesley Papers*. (ed.) M. Martin, Vol. II, p. 231.

[3] This is to be inferred from Welleseley's private correspondence with Anstruther. *Wellesley Papers*, op. Cit.

[4] Registrar, Dacca Court, to Government, 1st July 1800, Criminal Judicial Consultations, 20th Nov. 1800, No. 4.

Court's writ must be honoured. The Dacca Court was accordingly directed to deliver the property in question to Osborne[1].

In 1805, an officer of the Sheriff arrived in Murshidabad, to seize a local resident, Srikanta by name, under the Supreme Court's orders. Srikanta sought the protection of the Judge of Murshidabad stating, on oath, that he had never made himself amenable to the Supreme Court either by residence in Calcutta or by voluntary submission. On this basis, Becher, the local Judge-Magistrate deferred his permission to the Sheriff's agent for seizing the person of Srikanta, and wrote to the Government for instruction[2]. In reply, the Governor-General-in-Council observed that whenever any question arose about the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, the latter alone were competent to decide the matter[3]. Bacher was told that his resistance to the Sheriff's writ had been absolutely unjustified.

In the same year Massie, the Judge of Nuddea was reprimanded by the Government for his refusal to assist the Sheriff in the seizure of an estate (in Nuddea) in satisfaction of a process issued by the Supreme Court, in the case of *William Marshall* vs *Raja Shambhu Chandra*[4]. Massie had taken the plea that the said estate assumed by the Supreme Court to be the property of Raja Shambhu Chandra, had, in fact, been mortgaged to a third party who had already obtained its possession under an order of the Nuddea Court. Following this case the Government circulated an order, on 7th November 1805, to all District Judges, forbidding them to resist the processes of the Supreme Court on any plea whatsoever and requiring them to assist the officers of that Court in every possible way[5].

The Bengal Government's decision in the above case stands in exact contrast to their earlier attitude in the case of *Banarsi Ghosh* vs. *Radha Mohan Ghosh* in 1796[6]. This only indicates how determined the Administration had become to assist in a smoother functioning of the Court.

In 1818, the Government of Bombay solicited instruction from the

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1 Resolution of Governor-General-in-Council 20th Nov. 1800, Criminal Judicial Consultation, 20th Nov. 1800, No. 5.

2 Becher to Government, 2nd Jan, 1805, Civil Judicial Consultations, 10th June 1805, No. 15.

3 *Ibid*, Secretary to Gofernment to Judge Becher, 10th Jan. 1805.

4 Civil Judicial Consultations, 14th Nov. 1805, Nos. 3 to 5.

5 Civil Judicial Consultations, 14th Nov. 1805, No. 6

6 See above p. 7

Bengal Government in a case in which the Judge of Salsette (one of the Districts under Bombay Presidency) had made a strong protest against the operation of a writ of the Bombay Supreme Court on certain property situated within his jurisdiction[1]. Spankie, the then Advocate General of Bengal, justified the Bombay Supreme Court's action stating that it was the constant practice of the Supreme Court of Calcutta to issue writs against properties situated in the mofussil if their owners fell within that Court's jurisdiction[2]." "The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court", he observed," was confined only by the description of persons, and I have never heard of resistance or remonstrance against the legality of such writs by any Judge and Magistrate, or by any other person, for which indeed there could be no column or foundation[3]. The Bombay Government was advised accordingly[4].

In 1820, the Government made an enthusiastic response to a request from the Sheriff for assistance in delivering certain estates in Midnapur District to a debtor, in satisfaction of an order of the Supreme Court. The Judge-Magistrate of Midnapur was reminded of the Circular Order of the 7th November, 1805, and instructed: "you will of course give such assistance as may be necessary to the Sheriff's officers... in the legal execution of the processes......"[5]

In 1822 the Government ignored a strong protest made by the Sadr Diwani Adalat against an alleged invasion of their jurisdiction by the Supreme Court[6].

So far the king's Court had functioned smoothly because the Government had extended its full cooperation without ever disputing the Court's actions. But with the coming of Bentinck in 1828, an attitude of criticism and hostility replaced the Bengal Administration's earlier passiveness towards the Supreme Court. Several factors could be responsible for this change.

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1 Civil Judicial Consultations, 16th Oct. 1818, No. 20.

2 Civil Judicial Consultations, 16th Oct. 1818, No. 20.

3 *Ibid*, No. 22.

4 *Ibid.*

5 Civil Judicial Consultations, 13th Oct. 1820, No. 17.

6 This protest had been made in the case of *Parsan Lal* vs *Baijnath Sahu*. The Supreme Court had taken cognizance of this case after it had been adjudicated upon by a series of Company's Courts and finally decided by the Sadr Diwani Adalat. The latter challenged the Supreme Court's action as being illegal, as according to the Act of 1780, the decisions of Sadr Diwani Adalat were conclusive—except in cases of Rs. 50,000/- and above when an appeal lay to the Privy Council. Civil Judicial Consultations, 30th Oct. 1822, No. 6.

The Government of Bombay and the Supreme Court there had been locked in a bitter dispute over the past few years[1]. As a result, a general reaction against the king's Courts might have been developing at the Controlling Presidency.

Besides, with the appointment of Metcalfe as the Vice-President of the Supreme Council, in 1828, a very strong authoritarian element was introduced into the administrative counsels of Bengal. This was irreconcilable with any degree of passivity or acquiescence on the part of the ruling power, towards the exercise of any authority by the Court which did not bear the explicit sanction of the Statutes. Metcalfe's ideal was an all-pervading Executive. In the District he wanted the Collectors to be vested with the function of Judgeship as well as Magistracy.[2] He lamented the fact that the Executive (Governor-General in-Council) had dissociated themselves from the personnel of the Sadr Diwani Adalat.[3] In the same spirit, he wanted the Supreme Court to function in complete subordination to the ruling power. Thus he observed:

*To me it seems quite clear that the supreme power ought to rest with the Government, and that in any case in which the exercise of the powers of the Court might be deemed injurious to the safetey or welfare of the State, the Government ought to possess authority to suspend the functioning of the Court as regarding that particular case, and the Court be bound to acknowledge and abide by the restrictive powers of the Government pending a reference to a superior authority in England".[4]

Lastly, the Governor-General, Bentinck, himself was not happily disposed towards the Court. The conflict between the Judges of Madras Supreme Court and the Government during 1800-3, while he was the Governor of that Presidency, was most likely to have prejudiced

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[1] The origin of the Bombay dispute had been the Supreme Court's assertion of a right to issue writs of *habeas corous*, for the release of Indians detained by the Government, and the Bombay Administration's firm denial of it.

[2] Metcllfe's Minute, 11th April 1831, Parliamentary Branch Collections, 1832, No. 77, Appx. IV, No. 6

[3] *Ibid.*

* The Sadr Diwani Adalat was initially constituted by the Governor-General and two members of the Supreme Council. A strong move for its separation from the Executive was launched by Wellesley in 1801, but it was only in 1811 that the Court could be completely separated' from the Supreme Council.

[4] *Ibid.*

his mind with a constant apprehension of exercise of unauthorised powers by the Judges of the king's Courts. He actually feared great injury to the Government and the public in Bengal, from the powers assumed by the Supreme Court in excess of their permitted authority, and he rejoiced at the assurances given by Ellenborough (President, Board of Control) to support the Government against the Court. He wrote: "I shall hail as a great public benefit the communication of your determination to support the authority of the Government, and to protect the feelings and interests of the natives, against the ever extending jurisdiction and ruinous processes of the Supreme Court"[1]

With such composition the Bengal Government became determined to dispute some of the powers which the Supreme Court had assumed by an interpretation of the Statutes, in the absence of any specific provision. The Governor-General bluntly wrote to the Supreme Court:

> "On several important points the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court appears to be doubtdul, productive of alarm to our native subjects, of embarrassment to the local Government and discreditable to our Country. In some instances it seems that those Courts have been complelled by a construction of law, contrary to the probable intention of the legislature, to extend their jurisdiction in [sic] a degree inconsistent with the public convenience......"[2]

In 1829, Metcalfe specifically accused the Supreme Court of having exceeded their jurisdiction in four cases, during the recent years.[3] In 1831, the same charge was repeated against the Court in another series of cases. In all these, the crux of the dispute was the Court's exercise of jurisdiction over the persons or properties of Indians situated in the mofussil. A review of a few of those cases would illustrate the point.

The case of *Morton* vs *Mehdi Ali Khan*[4] is the first in point of interest. The Plaintiff, Morton, was a British resident of Calcutta. He had

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1 Bentinck to Ellenborough, 6th July 1829, Colchester Papers, Public Records Office, London.

2 Governor-General to Supreme Court, 14th July 1829, para 4, Parliamentary Papers, 1831, Vol. 6; Appx. V, p. 2.

3 Metcalfe's Minute, 15th April 1829, Parliamentary Papers, 1831, Vol. 6., Appx.V. pp. 20-28.

4 The details of this case and two others, i.e. of the case between two British partnership firms of Calcutta, and the one of *Umesh Chandra Pal Chaudhry & others*, are stated in Metcalfe's Minute noticed above.

commenced an action against Mehdi Ali Khan, in the Supreme Court, for the recovery of certain debts, alleged, to have been contracted by the Defendant's servants at Calcutta on behalf of their master. Mehdi Ali Khan, a permanent resident of Oudh, had never lived in Calcutta. He had only been carrying on some trade there through his servants. The Supreme Court considered the Khan as subject to their jurisdiction in the case, took cognizance of the plaint, and had his goods and properties in Calcutta seized.

The Government contended that Mehdi Ali Khan could not be amenable to the king's Court because he was not only an Indian living outside Calcutta but was not even a resident of any part of Company's territory. *Hence in the absence of his voluntary submission, the Court's assumption of jurisdiction over him was entirely illegal.

In reply[1], the Chief Justice admitted that no specific provision had been made in the Statutes for the Court exercising jurisdiction over such cases. St. 21. Geo. III, Cap. 70, S. 28 (of 1780), had prohibited a British subject from proceeding beyond the radius of ten miles from Calcutta, without obtaining a special license from the Government. The Chief Justice, therefore, asserted "with confidence", that even the above provision did not intend to place those established at Calcutta, without a legal remedy there, against an Indian trader or banker of Calcutta, who might choose to live away from that City. Besides, argued the Chief Justice, the meaning of the word "inhabitants" could not be confined to include only residents. This had been established long before by Edward Coke**. St. 22 Henry VIII, Cap. 5, regarding repair of bridges had made the inhabitants of the Shire or Riding liable to contribute towards the repair and maintenance of bridges in the locality. From this Coke had construed that although a man may be dwelling in a foreign Country, yet if he had lands of tenements in his possession or management in the Country (England), he was an "inhabitant, both where his person dwelleth and where he hath lands

* Oudh remained the Nawab's territory, under his direct administration, until its annexation by Dalhousie in 1856.

[1] The Court's replies to the allegations of the Government have been stated in a letter from Sri Chrles Grey, the Chief Justice, to the Governor-General, dt. 22nd Oct. 1829, Parliamentary Papers, 1831, Vol. 6., Appx. V., Encl. 19.

** Sir Edward Coke was the Attorney General of England at the beginning of the 17th Century. Subsequently, he became the Chief Justice of Common Pleas and Chief Justice of king's Bench during the early Stuart period. He is famous for his *Reports and Institutes*, which have made an important contributions to the evolution of the English legal system.

or tenements in possession......"[1]. Henoe to regard Mehdi Ali Khan as being immune from the Court's jurisdiction, merely on the ground of his being a resident of Oudh, without considering the fact of his having trading establishments in Calcutta, would have been establishing a precedent contrary to the principles established by Coke. It would also, argued the Chief Justice, have been at variance with the principles of justice and against the ordinary course of law of merchants of most civilised nations of the world. He also pointed out the practical inconvenience to the settlers in Calcutta if the term "inhabitants" was inteipreted to include physical residents only. It was common for Indians to carry on exclusive trade and dealing in money and securities at Calcutta, by means of servants, while they themselves resided at Murshidabad, Patna, Dacca, Benares or elsewhere. The above construction of the word "inhabitants" would also imply that any Indian resident of Calcutta, having all his transactions and property in Calcutta, might cease to be an "inhabitant" of that City, the moment he chose to remove his physical presence from its limits. There being no Court at Calcutta competent to arrange for the trial in the interior, the net result in such situations would be that the mercantile parties of Calcutta might have to ask for licenses (from the Government) to go to "half the Zilla Courts of Bengal, if they had to see those with whom they dealt only in the vicinity of their own dwelling places".

Next deserving mention was a Criminal case.[2] Three Indian residents of Calcutta, (Khudabaksh, Sadatulla and Shallaroo), had been apprehended by the Police of Suburbs of Calcutta*, for burglary committed just outside the limits of Calcutta City. They were subsequently sent for trial before the Judge of Circuit (the Company's tribunal of Criminal justice) for Calcutta Division, who acquitted all three for lack of sufficient proof. While releasing the prisoners from his custody, (in accordance with the Circuit Judge's order), the Magistrate of Suburbs of Calcutta referred their names to the Police

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[1] Coke II. Inst., 697, p. 702, Quoted by Sir J. Frank, Judge of Supreme Court, in his Minute, dtd. 23rd Sept. 1829, Parliamentary Papers, 1831, Vol. 6, p. 83.

[2] Case of *khudabaksh and others*. The details of this case, the Government's allegations of the Court having exceeded their jurisdiction in it, and the× latter's plea in defense, are al included in a letter from the Supreme Court to Board of Control, dtd. Sept. 1830; Parliamentary Papers, 1831, Vol. 6., pps. V. pp. 44-48.

* Suburbs of Calcutta was a District adjoining the City of Calcutta, under full administration of the Company.

of Calcutta City, for investigation into their characters, since they were the residents of that area. The Calcutta J. P. (i.e. Magistrate) arrested all three and committed them for trial to the Supreme Court. The latter tried and convicted them all on the same changes for which they had earlier been acquitted by the Company's Criminal Court.

The Government charged the Supreme Court for not only having exceeded their jurisdiction by trying Indians for crimes committed outside Calcutta, but also of having violated the privilege of the Company's judiciary by retrying prisoners already indicted and acquitted by a competent Court of the Company.

Against the first part of the allegations, the Chief Justice asserted that since natives of Calcutta were considered subjects of the Crown, they must be amenable to the Supreme Court for all acts done within or without Calcutta, in the same manner as an European born British subject was. The Chief Justice's reply to the second part of the charges, (i.e. about having tried a case already decided by a Company's Court), was that, in the first place, the Supreme Court had no official information about the parties having been tried by the Company's Court. The Judges had been under the impression that the Court of Circuit had merely disclaimed jurisdiction over the case on the ground of the accused persons being residents of Calcutta. Even if the Supreme Court had the information, that, in the opinion of the Chief Justice, would not have formed any legal ground for the acquittal of those prisoners.

The last case of interest was that of *Umesh Chandra Pal Choudhry* and *Rattan Chandra Pal Choudhry* vs *Prem Chandra Pal Chaudhry* and others.[1] Both parties were residents of Calcutta. The case had been for the partition of an estate which had been jointly owned by the Plaintiffs and the Defendants. In 1829. the Supreme Court decreed the partition adjudging a fraction of the joint estate to the Plaintiffs. As the assessment of revenue had so far been on the estate as a whole, the Court, after assigning the shares, also distributed the public assessment on each.

The Government charged first that the Supreme Court's action of allocating shares of revenue assessment amounted to an interference with the Company's internal administration. They contended next

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[1] The details of this case with the Government's allegations are stated in Metcalfe's Minute, 15th April 1829, Parliamentary Papers, 1831, Vol. 6., Apps. V., pp. 20-28.

that the Supreme Court had no authority to partition or transfer property in the mofussil.

The Chief Justice's reply to all this was that under the Charter constituting the Court, full and exclusive power had been given to them to decide all suits, including those of inheritence and succession, between the inhabitants of Calcutta. If such parties disputed any property in the mofussil there could be no other way of settling the dispute except by transferring or partitioning such property.

Advocate-General Pearson viewed that the Supreme Court had been exercising this authority without legislative sanction.[1] He conceded, at the same time, that the Court had been exercising this authority from the earliest times without it being challenged. Cases in which this this issue had appeared upon the pleadings had gone to England in appeal and the Privy Council had decided them, without it having struck them that the Supreme Court had been exceeding their jurisdiction.

But while the Governments of Wellesley, Barlow, Minto, Hastings, Adam and Amherst had acquiesced and evenassisted in the exercise of such authority by the Supreme Court, the Bengal Administration of Bentinck and Metcalfe were bent upon challenging its propriety. Metcalfe informed that the Directors that: "In our [Government's] addresses to the Judges [of the Supreme Court]......we have specially guarded against the drawing of any inference which might imply an acquiescence on the part of the Government, in the jurisdiction exercised by the Supreme Court over estates in the mofussil......"[2]

Metcalfe alleged that the Judges were always inclined to take advantage of the vagueness of the Statutes and extend their jurisdiction beyond the actual provision.[3] The Judges of the Supreme Court, on the other hand, compalined of a lack of cooperation from the Government. They regretted that instead of facilitating a synthesis between the Company's judiciary and the Supreme Court, the Government had been inclined to erect their judicial structure separately and in a form of opposition to the king's judiciary.[4]

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[1] Pearson to Government, 3rd Feb. 1831; printed in Circular Orders of Sadr Diwani Adalat (ed. T. Jones, 1855), pp. 360-61.

[2] Judicial Letter from Bengal to Court of Directors, 19th April 1831.

[3] Metcalfe's Minute in Secret Department, 15th April 1829, Parliamentary Papers, 1831, Vol. 6., Appx. V., Encl. 8.

[4] Supreme Court to Board of Control, Sept. 1830, Parliamentary Papers, 1831, Vol. 6., Appx. V., No. 26, Encl. 4.

Both were extreme views. In fact the incidents of conflict between the Court and the Government, either during the pre-1800 period, or during the post-1828 period, were neither the outcome of a passion on the part of the Judges to enlarge their powers, nor the result of an attempt by the Government to obstruct the functioning of the Court. The occasions for friction arose out of the inadequacy of the provisions with regard to the jurisdiction of the Court and the consequent uncertainty in the exercise of their powers. Neither Statute 13 George III, Cap. 63 (of 1773), which created the Court, nor St. 21 Geo. III, Cap. 70, by which its jurisdiction was redefined, specifically provided for the contingencies in which the Court might have to issue processes against persons or properties outside Calcutta. As it came to be, persons or properties directly falling under the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, often involved properties and persons in the mofussil under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Company's judiciary. The Supreme Court, when called upon to decide such cases, were faced with the choice of either issuing their processes in the mofussil or abandoning their legitimate jurisdiction over the persons or properties within Calcutta. The Government, on the other hand, found the sanctity of their own administration threatened, when the writs of the Supreme Court started running into the Districts. Very often estates attached or sequestered by the king's Court were found subject to another litigation in the Company's tribunals, or even alrady adjudged to a particular party by the latter.

Persons directly subject to the Court's jurisdiction often held lands which contributed their share of revenue to the Company's Government. In the suits involving such parties the Court frequently found it necessary to seize, divide or sell such lands. Yet by St. 21 Geo III, Cap. 70, S. 8, they were forbidden to exercise jurisdiction in any matter which concerned public revenue. This was another ambiguous situation that the Court often had to face.

Even the definition of persons who were to be subject to the Court's jurisdiction was left vague in the Satutes. This gave rise to many doubtful cases. According to the Charter of 1774, the Court's jurisdiction extended to all "British" subjects and all inhabitants of Calcutta, whether Indians or Europeans. The question was—who were British subjects? In St. 21. Geo. III, and other Acts, the term "British subjects is never used in the sense to include any cateogory of Indians. But even in 1773 (when the Act was passed), Calcutta was king's territory

and the Indians living there must have been regarded as subjects of the Crown. That is why they had been made amenable to the king's Court. A distinction had therefore to be maintained between "British subjects" and the "Subjects of the Crown"[1]. This distinction was never stated in any of the enactments. It only rested upon the inference drawn from the term "British subjects" in the several Statutes, particularly St. 21. Geo III, Cap. 70. It was generally agreed that the term" "British subjects" included all persons born in Great Britain, or whose fathers or paternal grand fathers were born there, so as to exclude the Hindu and Muslim inhabitants within or without the Presidency towns.[2]

The liabilities of the "British subject" were fully defined by the Statutes. He was to be amenable to the Supreme Court for any Criminal act committed in any part of the Presidency.[3] In Civil cases too he was liable to the same tribunal so long as he lived in Calcutta. But if he went out of Calcutta as a private citizen, he was required to obtain a license from the Company's Government.[4] If he wanted to reside anywhere beyond the radius of ten miles from Calcutta, for personal reasons, he was required to execute a bond making himself ameanable to the local Company's Court for Civil actions against him[5]. By St. 53 Geo. III, Cap., 155. of 1813, British subjects residing in the interior were generally made amenable to the local tribunals of the Company in all Civil actions with Indians on the opposit side. No bond had to be executed henceforth. But such British subjects were allowed the choice of appealing from the local Court's decision to the Supreme Court instead of the Sadr Diwani Adalat.

But the position of an Indian inhabitant of Calcutta was not as certain once he left Calcutta. He was neither required to obtain a license for going out of Calcutta into the Provinces, not to execute a bond when he transferred his residence from that City to some place in the interior. What would his position be if he decided to leave

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[1] Supreme Court to Board of Control, Sept. 1830, Parliamentary Papers 1831, Vol. l. 6, Apps. V., No. 26, Encl. 4.

[2] Supreme Court to Board of Control, Sept. 1830, Parliamentary Papers, 1831, Vol. 6., Apps. V, No. 26, Encl. 4.

[3] An exception was made to this rule by St. 53 Geo III. Cap. 155, passed in 1813. By Cl. 105 of the Act British subjects residing out of Presidency towns were made punishable by local Magistrates for petty crimes by fine upto Rs. 500/-.

[4] By S. 28 of St. 21 Geo. III, Cap. 70.

[5] By Regulation XXVIII of 1793

Calcutta and take up residence in the interior? To whom would he be amenable if he committed a crime outside Calcutta? In the absence of any Statutory declaration the answers to such questions had to be supplied by interpretation. From the practice followed by the Supreme Court it is apparent that in many ways, they tended to place the Indians of Calcutta in the same position as the British subjects in respect of their liabilities to the Court. Thus Indians from outside Calcutta were allowed to sue or be sued by, Indian residents of Calcutta in the Supreme Court.[1] The justification for this practice was obviously drawn from that Clause of the Charter which permitted Indians not amenable to the Court to submit voluntarily to their jurisdiction, in suits instituted against them by British subjects.[2] Likewise the Supreme Court donsidered the Indians of Calcutta as liable, in the same manner as the British subjects, for crimes committed in any part of the Presidency.[3] The Court threatened to go even a step further. They claimed that the existing legal status of even the Indians living out of Calcutta was the same as the Calcutta Indians for they were now equally subjects of the Crown and as such there was no constitutional justification why they should not be liable to the Supreme Court for crimes committed anywhere.[4] Their reasoning was as follows: In the Charter of 1774 the term "British subjects" had been used generally to exclude the Indians living out of Calcutta who, though being governed by the Company, were still nominally considered as subjects of the Moghul Emperor. But since then the situation had materially altered. Though it can not be precisely stated when the dominion of the Moghul Emperor formally terminated and that of the Crown begun over the entire Presidency, it was at least clear that the sovereignty of the British Crown over all the Company administered territories in India was indirectly presumed in 1813, by Act 53 Geo III..., Cap, 155. In it the territories under the Company's administration lying outside the limits of the Presidency towns of Calcutta, Bombay and Madras, are referred throughout as "British Territories". And from this it followed that all those living there were king's subjects.

[1] See above pp. 4-7

[2] See above p. 2.

[3] The case in particular reference is that *Khudabaksh & others.* See above p. 13.

[4] Supreme Court to Board of Control, Sept. 1830, Parliamentary Papers, 1831, Vol. 6, Apps. V., Encls. 16-18.

The Judges even argued that technically the Supreme Court was the only tribunal in Bengal with Parliamentary sanction to try charges of crimes and misdemeanours, other than abuses in the collection of revenue.[1] They claimed that the entire establishment of the Sadr Nizamat Adalat and the subordinate Courts of Criminal justice, created and maintained by the Company had been made without any authority from the Crown or Parliament. St. 21 Geo III, Cap. 70, had recognised the existence of the Courts maintained by the Company. But the only Courts managed by the Company then, (i.e. in 1780), were the Sadr Diwani Adalat and the Courts of Civil judicatures subordinate to it. The Sadr Nizamat Adalat and the entire machinery of Criminal judicial administration were then under the control of the Nawab. The Company had taken over this function 1790, the arrangements having been formally provided for by the Regulations framed by the Bengal Government in 1793. But in 1793, the Judges argued, no power had been created by the Crown or Parliament under which, except for revenue offences, the Bengal Government could establish Courts of Criminal justice. In other words the Act of 1780 had only given a retrospective recognition to the existing judicial set up of the Company. It had extended no prospective sanction for tribunals to be composed by them in the future.

The above analysis of the Judges might not have been wrong in theory, though it would have been impossible and impracticable to follow it up in practice. Actually, the Judges never claimed the Indians living out of Calcutta as being amenable to the Supreme Court for crimes committed by them. Nor did they ever challenge the existence of the Sadr Nizamat Adalat and the subordinate Criminal Courts. Their argument was only meant to emphasise that the jurisdiction being exercised by them was well within their permitted authority.

The Government's stand, on the contrary, boiled down to the following.

Indians were subject to the Supreme Court only so long as they lived in Calcutta. Once they moved out of that City, they moved out of the Court's jurisdiction, both in Civil and Criminal matters. After leaving Calcutta they could be liable to the Supreme Court only for crimes committed during their residence in that City. For crimes

[1] Supreme Court to Board of Control, Sept. 1830, Parliamentary Papers, 1831, Vol. 6, Appx. V, No. 26, Encl. 4, pp. 117-40.

committed outside Calcutta they were to be subject to the ordinary jurisdiction of the local Court's of the Company.[1]

So long as the Parliament did not declare their actual intention on the above issues, both the Court and the Government could assert, with equal justification, their own interpretation was correct. Here lay the real seed of contention. Metcalfe rightly observed that after 1780,

> "either from a better understanding of the intentions of the legislature, or from a mutual moderation between the Government and the Judges, or from a submission of the Government to gradual or quiet encroachments [by the Supreme Court]...... there has not been the same degree of misunderstanding or dispute regarding the powers of the king's courts; but it is evident from what is now passing at this Presidency and from what has happened before, both at Madras and Bombay, that seeds of dissension still exist in the undefined conditions of the jurisdiction of the Supreme Courts"[2].

Following the recents dispute suggestions were made from several quarters for working out an arrangement that would reduce the chances of friction between the Court and the Government. The Chief Justice, Sir Charles Grey, suggested the division of the Presidency into two watertight compartments, one in which the Supreme Court would coordinate the administration of justice according to English law, with the assistance of a chain of subordinate Courts, and the other in which the existing judiciary of the Company was to function without any hindrance from the former[3]. But when the general administration of the Country was one, it would have been most impractical to bifurcate it merely for the purpose of judicial administration. Bentinck found the proposal objectionable both on political and commercial grounds[4].

Metcalfe advanced a different proposal for the reform of the Court's jurisdiction. In effect it called for a virtual surrender by the Supreme Court of all its claims which in the past had led to friction with the

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[1] The views of the Government are deducible from Metcalfe's Minute in Secret Department, 15th April 1829, Parliamentary Papers, 1831, Vol. 6, Apps. V., Encl. 8.

[2] *Ibid.*

[3] Supreme Court to Board of Control, Sept. 1830. Parliamentary Papers, 1831, Vol., 6 Appx. V, No 25, Encl, 4, pp. 117-40.

[4] Governor-General to Supreme Court, (n.d.), paras 9-17, Parliamentary Papers, 1831, Vol. 6, Appx. V, No. 28.

Government.[1] The most revolutionary part of his scheme was that which would authorise the Government to suspend the operation of any order of the Supreme Court in cases of doubtful interpretation, pending a ruling by the Privy Council. This suggestion was particularly obnoxious to the Judges. The Chief Justice retorted: "Of this I can never express an approbation until I am told by the sole competent authority [the Parliament] that the sovereignty of the king-in-Parliament is only nominal in India......"[2]

Bentinck also carried on some discussion with the Court for exploring the ways and means by which the Court and the Government might arrive at a smoother working arrangement. But there could be no agreement between him and the Judges[3].

The merger of the Supreme Court with the Company's judicial system was the answer to all the difficulties. Several authorities including Bentinck and Metcalfe subscribed to this idea[4]. But this could not be feasible without the creation of a common law-giving authority for all persons and the formation of common codes applicable to Indians and Britions alike.

Meanwhile, the existing rivalry between the Government and the Supreme Court had been engaging the attention of the authorities in London. A strong opinion had been building up at the Board for an intervention in favour of the Government. Already in 1829, Ellenborough, the President of Board of Control had privately communicated to Bentinck his determination to support the Bengal Government against the Court[5]. His successor, Charles Grant, made a strong plea for putting the Supreme Court's jurisdiction under the control of the Indian Governments[6]. Two more personalities pushed the campaign (at London) against the Courts with great zeal. They were T. B. Macaulay, the Secretary of the Board and James Mill, the Examiner of Company's correspondence.

Macaulay had for long held a contemptuous opinion of the Court and had publicised it with his magnificent rhetoric. He regarded the

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1 Metcalfe's Minute, 15th April 1829, Parliamentary Papers, 1831, Vol. 6, Appx. V, Encl. 19.

2 Minute of Chief Justice Grey, 2nd Oct. 1829, Parliamentary Papers, 1831, Vol. 6, Apps. V., Encl. 19.

3 Bentinck to Ellenborough, 23rd Feb. 1830, Colchester Papers.

4 Metcalfe to Bentinck, 11*th Oct.* 1829, Colchester Papers,

5 See above, p.11.

6 Grant's speech in Parliament, Hansard, Series III, Vol. XIX, pp. 512-13.

Supreme Court as unfit to administer justice to any class of Indians because its Judges were not familiar with their customs and usages.[1] He argued that the maintenance of the Supreme Courts (apparently considered to be constituted by better qualified Judges applying a superior system of laws) for a handful of British subjects in India gave an impression of partiality in favour of the latter. This in effect meant that: "We [British] proclaim to the people [Indians] that there are two sorts of justice, a coarse one, which we think good enough for them, and another of a superior quality reserved for ourselves"[2].

James Mill questioned the utility of retaining the Supreme Courts at all.[3] He argued that the Courts applying English laws had been originally established to administer justice to a small number of Englishmen who settled around the factories, because it was not considered safe to subject them to the strange Courts and procedures of the Moghul system. But the situation had changed since. A fully fledged structure of judicial tribunals was now organised and maintained in India by an English Administration which was under the constant control and supervision of the Parliament. As such, it had become superfluous to retain a separate judicial establishment for administering justice to a handful of Englishmen. This argument was quite plausible.

About a prevailing notion that the Supreme Court could bar the illegal acts of the Government, *Mill asserted that the Courts could offer such protection to Englishmen only. This was because the acts of the Indian Governments could be judged illegal only in relation to the laws framed by a superior authority, (the king and Parliament), upon which the rights and liberties of the English settlers still depended. The rights of Indian subjects were based solely upon the laws enacted by the Indian Governments. Hence there was no possibility of an Indian Government committing an illegal act against any Indian subject. This point has been more lucidly analysed by George Norton, the Advocate General of Madras, in the following paragraph:

> "The duty of the judicial authority is to administer that as a law, and to declare that to be illegal, which the Government has pronounced[to be so]. To bar any acts of a Government as

[1] Macaulay, Essays, Vol. III, p. 388.

[2] Minute of Macaulay, (n.d.), Parliamentary Papers, 1837-38, Vol. 41. pp. 218-20.

[3] Evidence of James Mill before Select Committee of House of Lords, 29th June 1832, Parliamentary Branch Collections, 1832, Vol. 77, pp. 119-21.

* The Bombay Supreme Court had, in effect, made this assertion by issuing a writ of *habeas corpus* for the release of an Indian detained under official orders.

illegal, is to assume to be the Government.........When the court would bar any acts as illegal it is precisely because they are not authorised by Government, though they may be under the guise of acts so authorised; when the local Government affects to authorise an act forbidden by the laws of a superior paramount Government, the local Government is not, in fact, the Government, but the organ of the Supreme Government [the British],......[when only it] is subjected to be judged of [for legality][1].

Even as regards the British subjects (governed by laws made in England), Mill commented that there had been very few instances in which a Government in India had been charged for injury to an Englishman, before a Supreme Court. Besides, he said, an Englishman would have abundant means of making his complaints known, and forurging his claims to redress (in England) if the Supreme Courts did not exist.

Mill also denied that the Supreme Court, on account of their superior legal ability and proceedings, had any influence in ameliorating the proceedings of the Company's Courts. This was because the system followed in the Supreme Court was basically different from that followed in the Company's Courts. He remarked: "In my opinion the English Courts afford more examples of what is to be avoided than what is to be followed in the tribunals erected in India"[2].

Such were the influences that were brought to bear upon the Parliament while they considered their verdict on the issues between the Courts and the Indian Governments. St. 3 & 4 William IV, (commonly known as the Charter Act) which renewed the Company's Charter in 1833, also sought to improve the Indian legislatures and reform the conflicting judicatures.

The Act established a central legislative authority for the whole of India which was to be the Governor-General-in-Council at Calcutta. They were empowered to make or repeal laws for all three Presidencies and for "all persons, whether British or Native, Foreigner or others, and for all the Courts of justice, whether

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[1] Norton to Malcolm (Governor of Bombay), 1st June 1830, Bentinck Mss, Nottingham University Library.

[2] Mill, *loc. cit.*, p. 27.

established by His Majesty's Charter or otherwise, and the jurisdiction thereof......"[1]

The long controversy between the Supreme Court and the Company's Government thus came to a close.. The latter had emerged decisively victorious. The laws enacted by the Government became binding in the Supreme Courts and the jurisdiction of the Court was placed entirely at the discretion of the Governor-General-in-Council. Only, the latter were prohibited from abolishing the Supreme Courts without the sanction from the Home authorities[2].

One might ask why the Supreme Courts were not abolished and merged into a common judicial system in 1833. The reason was that until common codes suitable for all were framed, it was considered prudent to continue administering justice to the British subjects according to the English procedure. The Judges of the Company, being devoid of professional training were considered unsuitable for administering justice in accordance with the English legal system. The Supreme Courts were, therefore, retained pending the formulation of the Indian codes.

A Law Commission had been constituted under the Act of 1833 for recommending a common legal system for India. For several reasons its deliberations were unduly delayed. It was only after the Civil Procedure Code was passed by the Legislature of India that the existing Supreme Court and the Sadr Diwani Adalat, and their jurisdictions, were merged into the High Court, created under the Indian High Courts Act of 1861.

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[1] St. 3 & 4 William IV, Cap. 85, S. 47.

[2] St. 3 & 4 William IV, Cap. 85, 5.46.

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PREPOSITIONAL VERBS IN THE YOGAVĀSIṢṬHA

SATYA VRAT

1. *Introductory*

Whether the prepositions help to bring out the different meanings already present in the root (*upasargā dyotakāḥ*) or denote a meaning of their own (*upasargā vācakāḥ*) is now an old controversy. Be that as it may, there is no denying the fact that when prepositions come to be prefixed to roots, changes in meanings generally occur. These changes are often many and varied.[1] This fact has been noticed in the *Siddhāntakaumudī* with reference to the root *bhū*. The same is the case practically with every other root. Sometimes the meanings of the roots with prepositions come to be changed so radically that it becomes difficult to connect them with their original meanings.

The use of more and more prepositions with the roots and the tendency to convey more and more meanings with the help of these instead of the independent roots became increasingly popular even in very early times. The multiplicity of roots, both Vedic and classical, came less and less to be used; the roots with prepositions coming to serve their purpose. Accordingly we find that in the *Yogavāsiṣṭha* roots with a number of prepositions occur in a variety of senses which sometimes are not very clear.[2]

Though hedged in with this difficulty the study of prepositions in the *Yogavāsiṣṭha* is both interesting and educative, for it opens up a fresh field of investigation for those who are interested in the use and function of prepositions in Sanskrit. The meanings in which some of the roots with some of the prepositions occur here may help the understanding of many a prepositional verb in later literature.

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1 Cf. the *kārikā* by Sākaṭāyana in his *Dhātupāṭha:* 'dhātvarthaṃ bādhate kaścit kaścit tam anuvartate tam eva viśinaṣṭy anya upasargagatis tridhā.'

2 In this connection it is profitable to quote the following interesting verse:

prakāśitāyodhanasauṣṭhavo 'tha
Māyāsuro 'nyatra vipakṣalokam.
viruddha eko 'dhiraṇaṃ babādhe
prasahya dhātvartham ivopasargaḥ.
Caṇḍīstotra, Canto 48, verse 61.

II. *Some Select Roots*

√*Añc*

With *ud*, this root is used in the *Yogavāsiṣṭha* in a sense slightly different from the one in which it is used elsewhere, viz., 'to go up', 'to rise' or 'appear'[1] as in 'jagad ālokya tat tādṛg *udakto*paplavāplutam'[2]. With *āṅ* in the participial form it means 'mixed or in contact with' (*sampṛkta*) as in 'rataklamaklāntapurārilakṣmīcalāṅgalekhākramaśīkar*āktam*'.[3] *Āṅ* is here evidently in the sense of *samantāt* (all round) and *ākta* has the sense of *samākta*.

√*Bandh*

With *anu*, this root has a number of prepositional uses. The use of the noun *anubandha*[4] in the sense of favourable or unfavourable conduct as understood by the commentator, is indeed striking. We do not come across this sense elsewhere in literature. Equally striking is the use of *anubadhnāti*[5] in the sense of forcing or compelling, (*nirbandhavati*).

√*Dhā*

The prepositions that generally occur with this root in the work are *sam*, *ā* (*ṅ*), *sam+ā* (*ṅ*), *anu+sam* and *anu+vi*. The most frequently used preposition however is *sam+ā* (*ṅ*) which occurs in the noun form of *samādhāna* in the sense of *dhyāna*, 'concentration' or *samādhi*, 'meditation'. With only *sam* also the root occurs. At one place it means 'to keep', 'to preserve a secret', etc.[6], a very uncommon sense, while at another it means 'to keep in mind', 'have in view[7]', which again is very uncommon. Usually we have *abhi+sam+dhā* in the sense 'to intend', 'to have in view'. The omission of *abhi* in the present instance is quite peculiar.

With *anu* and *sam*, dhā occurs several times in the sense 'to think of[8]'. In the prose passage 'śithilībhutavāsanaḥ kurvann api phalam *nānusamdadhāti*[9]' also it has nearly the same sense.

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[1] Cf. pūrṇāt pūrṇam *udacyate*.

[2] VI (ii). 134.36.

[3] VI (ii). 124.24.

[4] '*anubandha*pare jantāv asaṃsaktena cetaṣā,' V. 77. 13.

[5] 'abalām *anubadhnāti* mām eṣa kila nāṅgakaḥ', IV. 7. 22.

[6] 'rahasyaṃ śṛṇu bho rājan.........coditaḥ *sandadhās*idam, VI (ii) 157. 2.

[7] 'phala*sandhīni* karmāṇi', V. 18. 16.

[8] V. 12.5; V. 50. 32.

[9] IV. 38.6.

√*Diś*

Two prepositional uses of this root attract special attention. One is *apadeśa* which has the rather unusual sense of 'the age predetermined (for a person)'[1], and the other is *vyapadeśya* which means 'worthy of special mention'.[2]

√*Grah*

Among the many prepositional uses of the root it is the two with *ud* that are worthy of note. In both these the form is *udgrāhita*. While in one: 'parṇoṭajāgraviśrāntaśuk*odgrāhita*śāstradṛk[3],' the meaning is 'uttered', 'pronounced', 'expressed' in the other: 'vicāritam alaṃ śāstraṃ ciram *udgrāhitaṃ* mithaḥ[4]', the meaning is 'thoroughly grasped' 'rightly understood'. The suffix *ṇic* is here in *svārtha*.

√*Han*

With *ud*, *han* which has one of its primary meanings 'to move', comes to mean 'to move in an uncontrolled manner', 'to jolt', 'to strut' and thence 'to behave haughtily or insolently'. We have this sense in 'andhānām *uddhatir* yeyaṃ sā dṛśyāyaiva jāyate'[5]. *Uddhati* means *auddhatya*, *ucchṛṅkhalatā*, 'unrestrained behaviour' and consequently 'audacity'.

With *parā* √*han* yields the sense of 'deformed', 'disfigured' 'stained' as in 'śubhāśubhaprasara*parāhatā*kṛtau.........manasi[6]', (vide the com.: *parāhata*=*malinīkṛta*). Elsewhere *parāhata* means 'contradicted', as in Amara *saṃkulakliṣṭe paraspara-parāhate*. *Parā* is antithetic to *āṅ* and means 'away', 'off' and implies 'separation'. This is [crystal] clear in the word *parāga* meaning (pollen) which separates from the flower and *drops down* (*parāgacchati*). Here *awayness* stands for *thoroughness*.

At two places in the *Yogavāsiṣṭha* is the use of *han* found with *upa*. In both these the past participle form of *upahata* is used. The meaning however differs in both. While at one place it means 'overpowered or

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1 'dehaṃ tyaktvā '*padeśānte* (pare pariṇatiṃ gataḥ)', VI (ii). 158. 4

2 'nārīsaujanyacarcāsu *vyapadeśyā* bhaviṣyasi', VI(i). 109. 31.

3 VI (ii) 181. 14.

4 IV. 57. 28.

5 V. 82. 20.

6 IV. 42. 52.

under the impact of'', at another place it means, 'withered off' or 'fallen off' or 'disappeared'.[2]

√*Hṛ*

In the *Yogavāsiṣṭha* the largest number of prepositional uses are those found with *hṛ*. Of these too the uses with *āṅ* (*ā*) far outnumber those with other prepositions. The very general and common meaning in which it is used is that of 'doing or accomplishing a thing[3]'. *Hṛ* with *āṅ* is also used in a number of senses of 'acquiring', 'gathering', 'amassing[4]' (even without the concomitant *sam*); 'bringing in', 'effecting[5]', 'withdrawing unto oneself[6]' (even without the usually accompanying *prati*), 'earning[7]', 'enjoying', 'suffering', 'experiencing'[8], 'accepting',[9] 'taking away', 'snatching away', 'taking captive[10]'.

'Food' is the general acceptation of *āhāra*. Its verbal use however is rather unusual. This is found in the verse 'nirvāsanaḥ śāntamanā vada vraja pib*āhara*[11]'. We have it again in the verse:

> Devā ūcur ayaṃ devi upahārikṛto 'mbike
> sārdhaṃ svaparivāreṇa śīghram *āhriyatām* iti.[12]

Ahārya, kṛtya form of *āhṛ* is found in two different senses in the *Yogavāsiṣṭha*, one 'to be acquired'[13] and the other 'the artificial aids to beauty like ornaments, unguents[14],' etc.

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[1] 'saṃsāramadirā seyaṃ avidyety ucyate budhaiḥ anay*opahato* lokaḥ kalyāṇaṃ nādhigacchati', IV. 21. 39-40.

[2] 'puṇyakṣayānusandhānāt.........papāt*opahatā*kṛtiḥ', IV. 8. 15.

[3] 'vicitrakāryakartṛtvam *āharad* vāsanāvaśāt', IV. 42. 35;
'samatām alam āśritya samprāptaṃ kāryam *āharan*', V. 13. 39;
'harṣāmarṣavinirmuktaḥ pratyahaṃ kāryam *āharan*', V. 60. 4;

[4] 'na hṛṣyanti na kupyanti nāviśanty *āharanti* ca', VI(ii) 98.2; 'anyacchrotum ath*āhartuṃ* śāntaṃ necchati me manaḥ', VI(ii) 201. 13.

[5] 'Rāma nirvāsanībhāvam *āharasva* vivekataḥ' (Com. *āharasva*=*ātmany āpādaya*), IV. 34. 27; 'upaśamasukham *āharet pavitram*', V. 8. 18.

[6] '*āhṛtya* sarvabhogebhyo mano markaṭacañcalam', V. 1. 9.

[7] 'punar apy *āpharan* dhanam', V. 25. 3.

[8] 'samprāptam *āharan* svastha ākāśa iva tiṣṭhati', VI (ii). 134. 14.

[9] 'tataḥ prabhṛty asau dṛśyaṃ *nājahāra* na *vā* tyajat', V. 12. 3

[10] 'Devāsurakuṭumbinyaḥ.........aparasparam *āhṛtāḥ*', V. 41.40. As a matter of fact this goes against the usage. The sense of *āṅ* is 'this way', 'hither' and not 'that way', 'thither'. In fact the author's use of *āṅ* is out of place. *Hṛ* alone could convey the sense of 'taking away; etc.

[11] VI (ii). 106. 24.

[12] VI (ii). 134. 14.

[13] 'na tv *āhāryo* guṇo 'sya saḥ', V. 12.3.

[14] This sense is very much related to the first and is in reality a corollary to it. 'prabhutābṛṃhitaṃ ceto nāhāryam abhinandati', V. 46. 6.

Upasaṃhāra is generally used for 'conclusion or denouement'. But the *Yogavāsiṣṭha* uses only *saṃhṛ* to convey this sense. Instead of saying *upasaṃharan* the author says only *saṃharan: 'sāṃharan* prastutaṃ vastu'[1]. Another meaning of *hṛ* with *sam* is exactly the same as is conveyed by it with *prati* and *āṅ*. *Pratyāhāra* means 'withdrawing unto oneself', and so does *saṃhāra*. We have this sense in the verbal use of the root in '*sañjahāra* bahiś cittaṃ sāyam arko rucim yathā'[2].

Hṛ with *sam*, *ud* and *āṅ* is found in the *Yogavāsiṣṭha* in the sense of 'proclaiming'. The context where the word is used in the work is the one where sage Vasiṣṭha is relating as to how he was given the name Vāta-Vasiṣṭha by the Siddhas: 'Siddhair Vātavasiṣṭākhyas tair ahaṃ *samudāhṛtah*'[3]. *Samudāhṛtaḥ means prakīrtitaḥ* or *ghoṣitaḥ*.

Saṃ+hṛ is used in the *Yogavāsiṣṭha* in the sense of 'withdrawing', as for example, 'tapaḥ *saṃhara*.[4] The more common sense, viz. 'destruction' is also to be met with in the above verse, for there the penance is said to be *saṃhāri* which means 'leading to destruction or total annihiliation'.

With *sam* and *āṅ*, *hṛ* comes to have a number of different meanings among which mention may be made of 'doing or accomplishing'[5], 'collecting'[6], 'withdrawing'[7], 'amassing'[8] and 'stabilizing'[9]

The twofold use of *abhi+ā+hṛ* is found in the *Yogavāsiṣṭha*. One, where the sense is 'to go about or to follow', (the routine course) as 'nijam *abhyāharan* kramam'[10], and the other where the sense is 'to win over by gratification'[11].

The generally accepted sense of *upa+hṛ* viz. 'to offer', 'to present' or 'make a gift of' is ignored by the author. He uses it instead in the sense of 'doing', 'performing', in the verse: 'prāptakarmā yathānyāyaṃ kāle kāle hy *upāharat*'[12], where the word karma is understood. With

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[1] VI (i). 1. 22.
[2] VI (ii). 138. 15.
[3] VI (ii). 95. 9.
[4] VI (ii). 180. 33.
[5] 'tṛṣṇāsantyāgaṃ ca *samāharet*', V. 24. 52.
[6] 'guṇa*samāhāraḥ*', V. 14. 47.
[7] 'vāsanābhyaḥ *samāhṛtya* manaḥ', V. 52. 7.
[8] 'dānādāna*samāhāra*vihāravibhavādikāḥ kriyāḥ' (*samāhāraḥ=sañcayaḥ*), V. 74. 48.
[9] 'nāsādyate hy anabhyastā.........tasmād enāṃ *samāhara*', V. 24.21. (*samāhara =abhyāsena sthirīkuru*—Commentator).
[10] VI (ii). 198. 34.
[11] 'dhanair *abhyāhared* bhavyān sujanān', V. 24. 66.
[12] VI (ii). 216. 15.

an additional *āṅ*, he uses it in the sense to avail oneself of', 'to make use of', as in: 'naṣṭaṃ naṣṭam upekṣasva prāptaṃ prāptam *upāhara* (=*upayuṅkṣva*).'[1]

'Avoiding or doing away with' is the sense that *hṛ* yields with *ava* as in 'ratiñ *cāvaharet* samam'.[2]

Saṃvyavahāra is 'mutual dealings'. This is the commonly accepted sense of the term but in the *Yogavāsiṣṭha* it is used in the sense of *vyavahāra, paribhāṣā*:

tena jātaṃ tato jātam itīyaṃ racanā girām
śāstra*saṃvyavahārār*thaṃ na Rāma paramārthataḥ.[3]

√*Jan*

Ā (*ṅ*) *jan* does not mean in the *Yogavāsiṣṭha* 'to come out from', 'to be born of', in which sense it is found used in most of the Sanskrit works.[4] It means just the reverse. In the verse 'anyā dhūmādim *ājātā* Rāma jīvaparamparā[5]', *ājātā* means 'having entered'. 'Entering' or *anupraveśa* is, therefore, the sense of *ā*+*jan* intended by the author.

√*Kṛ*

This root is found most frequently with *ā*(*ṅ*). Strangely enough we do not meet with many prepositional uses of this root in the work though this is undoubtedly one of the most popular roots in Sanskrit used with a number of prepositions elsewhere.

The preposition *āṅ* has two senses, one of 'comprehension', 'pervasion' (*abhividhi*) and the other of 'slight' (*īṣat*). In both of these it is used with *kṛ* in the work, a combination quite rare elsewhere. In the former sense it is found in the verse:

'jaṅgalaṃ janavicchedavibhaktaṃ kham iv*ākṛtam*'.[6] (*ākṛtam samantāt kṛtam*). In the latter sense it is found in the verse: 'muktaś calitum *ākartuṃ* śaknoti na manāg api'[7], where *ākartum* = *īṣat kartum*.

Further, with *ā*(*ṅ*) the root means 'to form'. In this sense it is found in numerous verses of the work. When *pari* too is coupled with it +(*āṅ*) the meaning undergoes a drastic change. The *kṛdanta* word

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[1] IV. 46. 7.
[2] V. 24. 44.
[3] IV. 40. 17.
[4] 'kuta *ājātā* kuta iyaṃ visṛṣṭiḥ', R.V.X. 191. 6
[5] IV. 60. 9
[6] VI (ii). 181. 8
[7] V. 85. 9.

paryākṛti means 'of circular form'.[1] The other forms like *samākāra*, *vikāra* etc. are too well-known to be included in this study.

Kram

This root is found in the work with the prepositions *ā(ṅ)* and *sam ā(ṅ)*. With *ā(ṅ)* it is more frequent while with *sam*+*ā(ṅ)* it is found but once. *Ā (ṅ)*+*kram* occurs in the work at least thrice. In two cases it means 'to overpower': (1)' jñanam tad upadiṣṭam............kintu dāhyam *ākramya* nocitam'.[2] (2) 'mānasenāpi karmaṇā yet kṛtenāpi jño *nākramyate*'[3]. 'In the third case it means 'to control', 'to restrain': 'svendriy*ākramaṇam* vinā'[4]. In its only single use *sam*+*ā*+*kram* means 'to overtake or to approach quickly':

tatas tena *samākramya* gṛhaṃ nītvā dinatrayam
saṃsthāpya tava līlārtham ihānīto Raghūdvaha.[5]

√*Kṛṣ*

Nikarṣaṇa from *kṛṣ* with *ni* is found twice in the work and in both the cases the meanings differ. While in one: 'ākāśa karṣakaṣa eva *nikarṣaṇaṃ* te[6], it means 'rubbing (on the touchstone etc.)', in the other: 'sarvāsu dikṣv aśanivarṣa*nikarṣanena*[7]', it means 'the destruction of the ramparts (*vapracchedana*)'.

√*Kṣip*

Kṣip with *ā(ṅ)* is used in the work, mostly in uncommon senses.[8] Thus, for example, *ākṣepa* is used in the sense of *saṅkoca*, 'small or limited form'. With *vāsanā* leaving, a person is said to become *apagatākṣepa*[9]. It means he leaves his limited self. *Ākṣepa* is thus used here as an equivalent of *saṃkṣepa*. This is peculiar. Ordinarily, *kṣip* with *āṅ* means 'to sketch out', 'to protrude', 'to assail', 'to intercept', 'to object to', 'to suggest'. Ā(*ṅ*) has nowhere the sense of *sam*.

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1 'vrajan *paryākṛtau* kūpe pātālatalabhiṣaṇe', VI(i). 89.26.

2 VI (ii). 155. 12.

3 IV. 38. 16.

4 VI(i) 81. 15.

5 VI (ii). 159. 24.

6 VI (ii). 116. 16. The commentary seems to read here *nigharṣaṇa* which in view of the sense of 'rubbing' yielded by it appears to be more reasonable. May be *nikarṣṇa* is a corrupt form of *nigharṣaṇa*.

7 IV. 28. 8.

8 Among its common senses is one 'interception' which is to be met with in the verse: 'athaivaṃvādinas tasya vākyam *ākṣiptavān* aham', VI (ii). 152. 9.

9 IV. 35. 68.

With *abhi*, *kṣip* occurs in the verse: 'Mahendro maṇdragarjābhir *abhikṣipati* garjataḥ[1], where it has the sense of 'reprimanding', 'chiding' (vide Comm. *abhikṣipati=bhartsayati*). Now *kṣip* alone means 'denunciation', 'condemnation', 'reproach'. *Abhi* therefore does not make much difference to its sense.

The use of *kṣip* with *prati* in the sense of 'throwing off' or 'casting off' is rare and unfamiliar. In '*pratikṣipantaḥ* saṃsāramihikāvaraṇāṃ vayam,[2]' we have precisely this very sense. Generally *pratikṣip* is used in the sense 'to reject', 'to repudiate' which is a mental act opposed to the physical one intended in the Text.

√*Labh*:

Labh is used in the work with the prepositions *sam+ā(ṅ)*, *ā(ṅ)* and *vi+pra*. With *sam* and *ā(ṅ)* this has the senses of 'putting together', or 'mixing'[3] and 'sprinkling with or spraying with'.[4]

With the single preposition *ā(ṅ)* it has the sense of 'touch'[5] in the work. Generally we meet with this use in the Vedic literature. With *vi+pra*, *labh* means 'to deceive'. In this sense we meet with the noun form *vipralambha* in the work.[6]

√*Līṅ*

In the sense of 'weak and emaciated' occurs the word *avalīna* from *līṅ* with *ava*, in the verse 'ālānam *avalīnānāṃ* vanyānām iva dantinām'.[7] This is rare in Sanskrit literature.

√*Mṛj*

'To wash off' or 'to rub off' or consequently 'to remove' is the sense of *mṛj* when it is coupled with *apa*. The removal of inner or outer darkness by a person is said to be the *apamārjana* of it: hārdaṃ bāhyaṃ ca timiram *apamṛṣṭavatā* tvayā'.[8] This is exactly the sense of the root when instead of *parā*, *pra* comes to be prefixed to it as can be seen from the verse:

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[1] VI (iii). 114. 9.

[2] V. 4. 30.

[3] 'vadhūmukhauṣadhīpuṣpa*samālambhana*bhūmayah', VI (ii). 6. 26. The *Amarakoṣa*, however, reads *samālambhana* in the sense of 'pasting', 'smearing', *vilepa*.

[4] 'kuṅkumenotasave mṛtoyoḥ *samālabdhā* iva srajaḥ', III. 48. 59.

[5] 'bhāvais tair eva tair eva tucchā*lambha*viḍambanaiḥ', VI (ii). 6. 6.

[6] 'cireṇa parikhinnāḥ smo *vipralambhāḥ* punaḥ punaḥ', VI(ii) 6. 6

[7] VI (ii). 93. 77.

[8] VI (ii). 214. 26.

Yat sambhṛtam anantena janmadoṣeṇa no malam
tat *pramṛṣṭaṃ* tvayehādya hemnām iva havirbhujā.[1]

The sense of 'washing' is yielded by the participial form of *vinirmṛṣṭa* (*vi+nir+mṛj+ta*) in the verse 'parasparа*vinirmṛṣṭa*daśadarśanadanturam'.[2] Here, the ten quarters are said to be washed by the waves of the ocean. Now, when a thing like a painting is washed off it loses its beauty and charm, its colours fade out and it becomes indistinct and blurred. It is in this secondary sense of 'indistinct' or 'blurred' that we find *pronmṛṣṭa* (*pra+ud+mṛj+ta*) used in the *Yogavāsiṣṭha* verse:

'varṣa*pronmṛṣṭa*citrābhaṃ jagat paśyaty avāsanaḥ'.[3]

The author here says that 'a person bereft of *vāsanā* will see the whole universe like a painting washed off by rain'. With the preposition *anu* coming before it as in 'mahārambh*ānumṛṣṭāni* śūnyāni ca parasparam,[4] √*mṛj* (*anu+mṛj+ta*) comes to mean 'to weigh'.

√*Mṛś*

This root is found in the *Yogavāsiṣṭha* with quite a few prepositions but the one with which it is coupled most frequently and conveys a large variety of senses is *parā*. Indeed it is one of the most frequently repeated prepositional uses in the entire work. The popular sense of *parāmarśa* especially in modern times, is 'consultation'. But this is only one of its many senses. √*Mṛś* is read in the *Dhātupāṭha* in the sense 'to touch'. Then it comes to mean 'to touch mentally'; viz. 'to think'. This sense is generally expressed with the help of *parā*. *Parāmṛś* is used in this sense at a number of places in the *Yogavāsiṣṭha*.[5] Even with parā, √*mṛś* is found used here as elsewhere in the primary sense, 'to touch', as we have it in 'tātacūtakadambāgra*parāmarśa*sugandhayaḥ'[6], and elsewhere.

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[1] VI (ii). 200. 54.
[2] VI (ii). 145. 47.
[3] VI (ii). 190. 57.
[4] VI (ii). 59. 19.
[5] 'vismayotkampitaśirā dhātuś ceṣṭāṃ *parāmṛśat*', V. 48. 13; 'mohāyaivā*parāmṛṣṭaḥ* sakalā lokasaṃvidaḥ', IV. 59. 6; '*parāmṛṣṭaṃ* viśiṣṭaṃ hi dṛṣṭaṃ naṣṭaṃ na bhāvitam', V. 9. 14; 'na *parāmṛśyate* yo'ntaḥ sa jīvanmukta ucyate', V. 16. 21; 'purvāpara*parāmarśān* nipuṇaṃ nipuṇāśayaḥ', VI(ii) 131. 27; '*prānmṛṣṭaṃ* kalpanādīnām anyaivārthakalāvatām', VI (ii). 178. 51.
[6] VI (ii). 114. 29.

The sense of 'rubbing off' (doing away with) is only a slight modification of 'touch', and we have this sense in the Text in 'ajñānam jñaptibodhena *parāmṛṣṭam*. praṇaśyati'.[1] From (physical) touch again the sense easily develops into that of 'clash', as we have it in 'paraspara-*parāmarśāt* kuntādyāyudhapaṅktayaḥ'.[2] As a matter of fact, it is a case of intensification of sense. Clash is strong contact, coming together impetuously or violently.

It is quite interesting that with *ā*(*ṅ*) too *mṛś* is used in the Text in the sense of 'thinking', 'reflecting': 'agṛhitātmakaṃ saṃvidūh*āmarśana*sūcakam'.[3]

√*Nam*

In the *Dhātupāṭha* this root is assigned the meaning of *prahvībhāva*, 'inclination', 'bending down', 'bowing'. With *ā*(*ṅ*) however, it means 'to come'. We have its participial use in 'paryantamaṇḍalādhīśamṛgay*ānata*bṛṃhitaih'.[4] *Ānata* here means *āgata*, 'come', in which sense it is rare elsewhere. It may be noted that *āgata* is the variant reading for *ānata* of both the Text and the Commentary.

√*Pad*

With *sam* and *ā*(*ṅ*), this root is used in the verse: 'svayambhūtva-*samāpattau* tathā dṛśyavyavasthitau,[5] in the sense of 'be coming'. The 'coming into being' is again the sense of the word *samāpatti* in the verse: 'cittāt sarga*samāpattiḥ*'.[6] This is one of the instances of the author's disregard of convention. Conventionally *samāpatti* means 'meeting', 'encounter', 'chance meeting', as in *samāpattidṛṣṭaḥ*.

In the verse 'anyath*opaprapadyeha* kalpyateyadi kāraṇam,[7] *upa* + *pra* + *pad* means 'to think or to take something in a particular sense', (*upaprapadya* = *gṛhītvā*). Here *upa* is in excess of requirement.

√*Pat*

It means 'to go' (*patl gatau*). But with *ni*, *pat* means 'to go down', 'to flow downward': *nipattyai*vaikayā 'kalpaṃ manobuddhyādivarjitāḥ'.[8]

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[1] VI (ii) 61. 23.
[2] VI (ii). 108. 44.
[3] VI (ii) 187. 36.
[4] V. 84.10.
[5] VI (ii). 96. 4.
[6] III. 119. 31.
[7] VI (ii). 174. 7.
[8] VI (ii) 186. 80

With the causal suffix it has the sense of 'falling *to death*.'[1] With an additional *sam*, it means in the noun form of *sannipāta* 'contract', 'association' (*saṃsparśa*., *saṃbandha*) as in 'vyapagatasukhaduḥkha-*sannipātaḥ*'[2].

Ā +*pat* is used in the work in noun-form in the sense of 'falling with a slight impact' as in 'karaṭ*āpāta*visphoṭā bhānty arthā vāsanādayaḥ'.[3] With *pra*, *pat* is used in the work in the noun form of *prapāta* in the sense of 'a place where water falls (from a mountain)' as in 'yathā *prapātā* payaso vicitrāḥ kaṇapaṅktayaḥ'.[4] In this sense we have it in the *Raghuvaṃśa* (2.26) too but lexicographers record its sense of a steep (*ataṭa* or *bhṛgu*) only.

√*Plu*

A(*ṅ*) and *upa* are the two prepositions with which the uses of this root deserve notice. With *a*(*ṅ*) in the past participial form it has the sense of 'full of': 'jadag alokya tat tādṛg udaktopaplav*āplutam*.[5] With *upa* in the noun form of *upaplava* it has here the unusual sense of *āplava* (or *āplāva*), flood. Commonly it means 'injury', 'damage', 'obstruction', or 'eclipse'.

√*Rudh*

This means 'to cover', 'to surround' (*āvaraṇa*). With *pari* it may mean 'to surround on all sides' (*pari*=*paritaḥ*), hence 'covering up'. This is precisely what *parirodha* means when it occurs in the *Yogavāsiṣṭha*: 'ahambhāvanayābhāti tvamahaṃbhāvavarjitaḥ saṃsāracakravahaṅam ātmanaḥ *parirodhayā*'.[6] *Rudh* with *pari* is rarely used elsewhere. It is the ego (*ahaṃbhāvanā*) which is a cover (*parirodha*) for the soul (*ātman*).

With *upa*, *rudh* yields the rather interesting sense of 'entreating' or 'urging' in (līlāpakṣiṣu) bhojanārthaṃ vadhūlokam *uparundhatsv* anāraṭam'.[7]

√*Ruh*

With *ava* this root means 'to climb down'. But *avaropitaḥ*,[8] the causal

[1] V. 80. 36.
[2] V. 74. 91.
[3] IV. 33. 38.
[4] VI (ii). 186. 79.
[5] VI (ii). 134. 36.
[6] IV. 33. 39.
[7] VI (i) 1. 13.
[8] 'ahaṅkārāṅkuraḥ kṛṣṭo hṛdayen*āvaropitaḥ*', IV. 33. 36.

participial form of it, means 'pulled out or taken out', (*utkhāya nirastaḥ*).

√*Ruh* with *sam* is very popular in the sense of 'healing' or 'becoming whole' (said of a wound). In the present work too, we meet with that sense:

*saṃrohatīṣaṇ*āviddhaṃ yathā paraśunā 'gninā
na tu jñānāgninirdagdhaṃ prabodhaviśadaṃ manaḥ.[1]

√*Sad*

This root (of the Tenth Conjugation) with *ā*(*ṅ*) means 'to get', 'to procure', 'to overtake, but as in other works so here it is used in the sense of 'destroying' as in 'asau devān *āsādayiṣyati*'.[2] Maybe, the author is using here the √*ṣadḷ* of the First Conjugation with the causal suffix, which has one of its senses, 'to perish'. But in that sense, we have usually the prefix *ava* or *ud*.

√*Sañj*

This root with *sam* and *ā*(*ṅ*) gives us the word *samāsaṅga* which occurs in the work at least four times and every time it is used it yields the same sense, viz. 'contact', 'union'. The combination of *sam* with *āṅ* in the case of this root is rare.

√*Sidh*

This root in the First Conjugation means 'to go'. *Utsedha* ordinarily means 'height', 'altitude' but in the present work it means 'to go', (to shoot up) by virtue of growth.[3] It may be observed here that this is too literal a meaning of the word: *ud*=up, *sedha*=going and is quite uncommon.

√*Sṛj*

The word *visarga* from *sṛj* with *vi* is used in the *Yogavāsiṣṭha* not in the popular sense of 'emission', 'release', or 'sending away', but in the rather peculiar and unfamiliar sense of 'absence of creation', *vi* standing for *vigama* or *viparyaya* as in 'ābhāte eva bhāte 'smin kṛcchrāt sarge *visargatā*'.[4]

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[1] VI (i). 2. 50.

[2] V. 38. 18.

[3] '*utsedham* eti bhukoṣakoṭarastho 'ṅkurotkaraḥ', IV. 36. 20. vide the commentary *utsedham*=*upacayena aunnatyam*.

[4] VI (ii). 143. 33.

√*Sthā*

This root is most frequently used in the work with *sam* which generally does not add to the sense, e.g. *saṃsthiti* in the work is often used in the sense of *sthiti* itself. But sometimes *sam*+*sthā* does yield different meanings. In the noun form of *saṃsthāna* it means 'a posture' at one place[1] and 'arrangement (of the seats of the limbs of the body)' at another.[2] In the participial form it means 'firmly planted', 'deeprooted'.[3]

In the expression *samāsthitaḥ* in the verse 'sa eṣa Kundadantākhyo dvijaḥ pārśve *samāsthitaḥ*[4]', the prepositions *sam* and *ā*(*ṅ*) do not add at all to the sense of the root, *samāsthitaḥ* simply meaning *sthitaḥ*, '*present*'. Elsewhere in literature, *sam*+*āṅ*+*sthā* means 'to resort to', 'to assume', 'to hold (an opinion)' etc.

With *sam* and *adhi*, *sthā* is used in the work in the sense of 'to stand at the head of', 'to supervise':

> 'jīvanmuktamanā mānyo viśvāmitro 'py ayaṃ prabhuḥ
> Vedoktāṃ makhanirmāṇakriyāṃ *samadhitiṣṭhati*.'[5]

Here *sam* is redundant. *Adhi* alone precedes the root ordinarily. In the verse: 'kālaḥ kriyā ca bhuvanaṃ bhavanaṃ cirāya nām*ādhitiṣṭhata* ivopavanaṃ vikāsi[6]', it is used with *adhi* alone (without *sam*), the sense being that of 'looking after or protecting', which is kindred to the sense of 'supervising' noted above.

A(*ṅ*) with *sthā* gives the sense of 'existence', *sattā*, as in 'itthaṃ gat*āsthitir* iyaṃ kila Rāmabhadra'.[7]

With *ni*√*sthā* is used in the work in the sense of 'to be in proper order', as in 'sargāḥ punar anye tv *aniṣṭhitāḥ*'.[8]

With *vi*+*ud*, *sthā* comes to mean 'to get up', 'to rise from *samādhi*' as in 'tathaiva vyavahāro 'pi *vyuthāne* me bhaviṣyati'.[9] With *abhi*, *sthā* undergoes no change in sense. In 'ātmany *evābhitiṣṭhati*[10], *abhiti-*

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[1] 'śeṣaṃ tu baddha*saṃsthānas* tiṣṭhāmy acalaśṛṅgavat', V. 86. 4.

[2] 'bhāsamānāsanasthāna*saṁsthānāḥ* kusumasthaliḥ', VI (ii). 145. 16. 'nānyonyam api paśyanti nānāsaṃsthānasaṃsthitāḥ, VI (ii) 94. 78.

[3] '*saṃsthito* yadi saṃkalpo duścikitsyaḥ svato bhavet', IV. 54. 33.

[4] VI (ii). 185. 17.

[5] V. 75. 23.

[6] VI (ii). 116. 23.

[7] IV. 59. 55.

[8] VI (ii). 128. 41. Com. - *aniṣṭhitaḥ*=*avyavasthitaḥ*.

[9] VI (i). 128. 58.

[10] V. 40. 10.

ṣṭhati is synonymous with *tiṣṭhati*. This is confirmed by the expression 'svātmany eva hi *tiṣṭhati*' in the immediately preceding verse.

Sthā with *pari* is uncommon in the verbal form, though we have the verbal derivative, *paritiṣṭhati*. The *Yogavāsiṣṭha* reads:

'rajorūpo hi saṃkalpo lokasaṃvyavahāravān
paritiṣṭhati saṃsāraputradārānurañjitah'.[1]

Here *pari* means 'pervasion', as elsewhere.

√*Viś*

The Text gives us a rather unfamiliar use of this root in *viviśanti*[2] in the sense of *praviśanti*.

The use of *ā*(*ṅ*) +*viś*, 'to insist', is also rare.[3]

√*Vṛji*

Generally this root with *āṅ* means *ānukūlyasampādana*, 'to win over', 'to captivate', 'to make one inclined in one's favour', but here it means 'permission',[4] (vide com. *āvarjanam*=*anujñā*)

√*Vṛt*

Āvarta from √*vṛt* is ordinarily used in Sanskrit in the sense of 'whirlpool'. The *Amarakoṣa* says 'āvarto 'mbhasāṃ bhramaṇ'.[5] But the *Yogavāsiṣṭha* assigns to it other senses too which are at once peculiar and striking. Thus it uses it in the various senses of 'circular movement', apart from its use in the popular sense of 'whirlpool' in one and the same verse,[6] 'water-mill',[7] and 'time'.[8] The basic sense of movement or circular movement is present in the sense of 'rolling' that the cognate expression *āvṛtti* has in the work[9]. Just as with *āvarta* so with *vivarta*. It too has been used in the various senses of 'movement',[10] 'circular

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[1] IV. 53. 36.

[2] V. 34. 30.

[3] 'na hṛṣyanti na kupyanti *nāviśanty* āharanti ca', VI (ii). 98. 2.

[4] 'Vāmadevādayaś cānye Viśvāmitrādayas tathā Vasiṣṭhaṃ purataḥ kṛtvā tasthur *āvarjanon*mukhāḥ', V. 1. 34.

[5] I. 10. 6

[6] 'jagatpadārthair *āvṛttair* uhyamānaiḥ parāvṛtaḥ', VI (ii). 141. 4; 'jagad pay. enam aniśaṃ *vāryāvarta*vivartavat', VI (ii). 144. 3; 'yathā dhūmasya nabhasi yathāmbhodhau mahāmbhasaḥ *āvarta*vṛttayaś citrās tathā cidvyomni saṃsṛteḥ', VI (ii) 100. 42.

[7] 'khe 'niśaṃ cakram ṛkṣāṇāṃ guṇ*āvarto* vivartate', VI (ii). 66. 11.

[8] 'utpattyotpatya līyante te tv *āvartavivartayā*', VI(ii) 66. 19.

[9] 'śayan*āvṛtti*nikṣepaparyākulitaśekharam', VI(i) 108. 9.
Then printed Text reads *āvṛti* which is obviously a misprint for *āvṛtti*.

[10] VI (ii). 66. 11.

movement'[1] and 'unreal change'[2] which are however not uncommon. Certanly uncommon is the sense of 'destruction' or 'ruination' which the participial form *vivṛtta* yields.[3]

With *abhi*, *vṛt* yields the rather interesting sense of passage (of time) as in '*abhyavartata* vai kālo ṛtusaṃvatsarātmakaḥ'.[4]

With *vi*+*ā*(*ṅ*), *vṛt* yields the sense of 'going round and round' as in 'saṃśayaḥ......... hṛdi *vyāvartate* lolaḥ kallola iva sāgare'.[5] This is rather exceptional for generally we come across *vi*+*ā*+*vṛt* in literature in the sense of 'turning away from' cf. viṣaya*vyāvṛtta*kautūhalaḥ', *Vikramorvaśīya*.[6] With *vi*+*pari* too it has the same sense.[7]

Pari+*vi*+*vṛt* (used in the context of the battle of gods and demons)[8] has the sense of 'to turn back and to come up again', 'the strategy of retreat and advancement.'

√*Yā*

The root *yā* is used here coupled with three prepositions *su*, *abhi* and *ā*(*ṅ*) which is quite peculiar and easily catches the eye: 'Cūḍālā rājakāryāṇi kṛtvā *svabhyā*yayau punaḥ'.[9] None of the prepositions is superfluous here. As pointed out elsewhere *ā*(*ṅ*) and *abhi* have the sense of *ābhimukhya* or 'this side' while *su* has a different sense of *suṣṭhu* or 'well' or 'with ease'. *Svabhyayāyau*, therefore, means 'came that side comfortably.'

In the verse 'yad yad Rāghava *samyāti* mahājanasaparyayā dinam,'[10] *saṃyāti*, merely gives the sense of 'passing', In the *Gītā*, *saṃyati* has the sense of 'passing onto', as in 'tathā śarīrāṇi vihāya jīrṇāny anyāni *saṃyāti* navāni dehī'.[11] But it is worthy of note that *saṃyātrā* has the specific sense of 'voyage' and does not mean 'journey or travel' in general as *yātrā* does.

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1 VI (ii). 66. 19.

2 '*vivarto* Brahmaṇo dṛśyam.', VI (ii). 97. 5

3 'kalpakṣobha*vivṛttāni* jaganti', V. 48. 2. But here too the basic idea of movement is present.

4 VI. (ii). 149. 3

5 IV. 21. 2.

6 1. 10.

7 'vāsanātantubaddho yo loko *viparivartate*', IV. 27. 31.

8 'prāṇāpāna VI (i). 73. 53.

9 VI (ii). 56. 25.

10 VI (i). 107. 7.

11 V. 4. 12.

√*Yuj*

With *ā*(*ṅ*), this root is used here in the sense 'to make use of' (*upayoga*). We have it in the verse: 'rasātalaras*āyogāt* tṛṇagulmalatādayaḥ janayanti yad ākāram'[1]. With additional *sam* it has the sense of 'contact' or 'union'. The word *samāyoga* is used here several times, and every time the sense is that of *saṃyoga*, 'contact or union.'

(1) draṣṭṛdṛśya*samāyogāt*[2]

(2) dehātmanoḥ *samāyogāt*[3]

(3) prāṇāpāna*samāyoga*samayam[4]

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[1] V. 68. 19.

[2] V. 8. 9.

[3] V. 67. 10.

[4] VI (i). 26. 11.

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REVIEW.

CONGRESS AND CONGRESSMEN IN THE PRE-GANDHIAN ERA, 1885-1917.

By DR. BIMANBEHARI MAJUMDAR AND
DR. BHAKAT PRASAD MAZUMDAR.

PP. IV+527. Firma K. L. Mukhopadhyay, Calcutta, 1967.

This is a joint production by two scholars, father and son, on the history of a very important organization, the Indian National Congress. It would be difficult to name another political organisation, anywhere in the world, which, after an uninterrupted existence and strenuous endeavour of more than sixty years is justly entitled to the credit of having played the dominant role in achieving freedom of the country from the yoke of a great imperial power. The division of the work, as stated in the preface, is that the facts were collected by the son on the basis of which the father wrote the historical portion forming Part I of the Book, while the son alone is responsible for the statistical data in the remaining two Parts of the book.

The author has shown on good grounds that Gandhi was not looked upon as an important personage in the Congress Session of 1917, and that is why he calls the period between 1885 and 1917 as pre-Gandhian era of the Congress. But one might well ask, did Gandhi play the dominant part in the Congress Session of 1918? He undoubtedly emerged as a leader in the Congress Session of 1919, but it would be difficult to say that he dominated it. Even in the Congress Session of September, 1920, his resolution on non-co-operation was opposed by such stalwarts as C. R. Das, B. C. Pal, Annie Besant, Malaviya, and Jinnah. It has even been held by many that the fate of this resolution would probably have been different if Tilak had not died shortly before the session. In any case, from every point of view, Tilak should be regarded as the dominant political figure till his death in August, 1920, and Gandhi attained this position only in the Nagpur Session of the Congress in December, 1920. So, the title of the book would have been justified if the story of the Congress would have been carried upto the Calcutta Session of 1920. As the nomenclature of the book is likely to create a wrong impression of

historical facts—and such errors die hard—it has been felt necessary to discuss the point at some length.

In describing the genesis of the Congress the author upholds the views, recently promulgated, challenging the part generally assigned to Lord Dufferin and Hume, but in a book specially dealing with the Congress the discussion should have been more elaborate with due reference to the opinions recently expressed by a number of writers. The author's account of the different sessions of the Congress, from 1885 to 1907 though brief, is accurate and informative. Specially valuable would have been his account of the Surat Session in 1907 but unfortunately he has omitted it and simply given reference to another book of his in which this controversial subject has been fully discussed. The author practically skips over the sessions of the Congress from 1907 to 1915, for he rightly points out that during this period the Congress 'became an organ of the loyal Moderates', and ceased to be a National organization. But unfortunately his accounts of the two Sessions in 1916 and 1917 are also very brief, and one might reasonably expect a little more critical discussion of them, particularly about the permanent secession of the Moderates from the great organization which they had done so much to build up.

The brief general account of the Congress Sessions is followed by a number of chapters, each dealing with a particular aspect of the Congress, such as the attitude of the Moslems towards it, its Presidents and inner circle, its views on Public Services, education, economic questions, judicial reforms, freedom of the Press and a number of miscellaneous points. As regards the Muslim attitude the author has devoted a whole chapter of 20 pages to combat the "belief that the Indian Moslems as a body kept themselves aloof from the Indian National Congress during the first three decades of its existence". As a matter of fact, nobody holds or ever held such a view, not even those whose statements he has quoted. All that they meant was simply this, that the Muslims, generally speaking, kept themselves aloof from the Congress. The truth of this is proved beyond dispute by the figures given on pp. 98-9 of the book which show that during a total period of twenty-two years (1894 to 1915) the Muslim delegates who attended the Congress formed only a little over 3 per cent of the total number of delegates.

Part II of the Book gives an alphabetical list of delegates who

attended the Congress between 1885 and 1917 indicating the subjects, if any, on which they spoke in the different sessions.

Part III contains a list of resolutions according to topics arranged in alphabetical order. The preparation of these lists must have involved hard labour but they would prove very useful to students of history, and have added considerably to the value of this book. The authors have not broken any new ground but richly deserve our thanks for collecting much useful information in a handy form. The reviewer hopes that the merit of the book will be appreciated by the students of the national movement as well as the general public.

R. C. MAJUMDAR.

COMMUNICATIONS

A COIN OF THE BENGAL KING VĪRAVIJAYANĀRĀYAṆA.

A. N. Lahiri.

While V. A. Smith practically failed to decipher the legend of this unique silver coin (cf. *I. M. Cat.*, Vol. I, p. 333, No. 1 Pl. XXXI. 13), R. D. Banerji could with some amount of success read the obverse portion of the legend, though what reading he gave of the reverse portion is far from satisfactory (cf. *An. Rep. Arch. Surv. Ind.*, 1913-14, p. 259, Pl. LXIX. 32).

The author of the present paper has now been able to decipher the entire legend of the coin, written in Bengali characters of about the fifteenth century continuously from the obverse to the reverse. The issuer of the coin was one Vīravijayanārāyaṇa (not simply Vijayanārāyana as read by Banerji), who, as its legend now discloses, subdued the might of one Hācheṅgsā, *i.e.* a king of Kāchār claiming descent from the mythical hero Ha-tsung-tsā, whose name is transliterated in the coin-legend as Hācheṅgsā.

The coin, belonging to the cabinet of the Indian Museum, is being published in the *Bulletin of the Indian Museum*, Vol. 2, No. 1.

A NEW INFORMATION ON THE DATE OF KANISHKA.

B. N. Mukherjee

The Charsada area, indentified with Pushkalāvati of Indian tradition and literature, is now being systematically excavated by the Peshawar University of West Pakistan. During an excavation at the Shakian Dheri of this locality, the excavators unearthed the remains of a burnt house.

According to an information received from Dr. A. H. Dani of the Peshawar University, coins, bearing the types of Kanishka I, have been found in this house. It appears that these coins of Kanishka I

were deposited there before the house was burnt down. Pieces of charred wood, found here, were sent to the laboratories of the Universities of Chicago and Mischigan, U. S. A. for radiocarbon dating. Results of the tests carried out in these laboratories indicate A.D. 93 as the date of burning of these pieces of wood.

If such an inference is acceptable, the house may have been burnt down in A.D. 93. And as the coins in question appear to have been deposited there before that date, the issuer of these coins began to rule before or in A.D. 93. This information strongly supports the theory equating the Kanishka Era with the Saka Era of A.D. 78.

Latest Publications of the Asiatic Society

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2. *The Early Annals of the English in Bengali.* Vol. II, Pt. II, Surman Embassy. Ed. by C. R. Wilson (Reprint), 422 pp., 1963 .. .. Rs. 35.00

3. *Tattvacintāmani-Dīdhiti-Prakāśa.* Vol. II by MM. Kalipada Tarkacharya. Royal 8vo, 370 pp., 1963 Rs. 20.00

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8. *The Rajbansis of North Bengal* by Dr. C. C. Sanyal. Royal 4to, 285 pp., 1965 .. .. Rs. 32.00

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11. *The Carrying Capacity of Land under Shifting Cultivation* by Shri S. Bose (Monograph Series, Vol. XII). Royal 8vo, 180 pp., 1967 .. .. Rs. 20.00

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